The president was in Alabama yesterday for a couple of events, including a fundraising reception for Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), who’s up for re-election next year. Bush delivered a fairly predictable speech on Sessions’ behalf, but one comment was noteworthy.
The president was explaining how his current war policy came together:
“I listened very carefully to senators like Jeff Sessions and senators who didn’t agree with what Jeff and I believed was necessary. I listened to our military. That’s what you want your President doing. […]
“So I made the decision to name a new commander, as well as send troops into Baghdad, all aiming to give this young democracy a chance to survive the relentless attacks from extremists and radicals who want to prevent their emergence.” (emphasis added)
This comes up from time to time, but the president is simply wrong. He makes this claim quite a bit, but Bush didn’t shape his policy on the advice of “our military.” Remember this from January?
When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against. […]
It may also be a sign of increasing assertiveness from a commander in chief described by former aides as relatively passive about questioning the advice of his military advisers. In going for more troops, Bush is picking an option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea almost since the time of the invasion.
If Bush wants to reject the advice of top military leaders, that’s his prerogative; he is regrettably the Commander in Chief. But to go around bragging about he listened to the military leaders when he did the exact opposite is ridiculous.
Indeed, were he really “listening to our military,” Bush would have heard some useful advice.
We sat down with military commanders there and here, and none of them said that additional troops would solve the fundamental cause of violence, which was the absence of national reconciliation. We always asked if additional troops were needed. We asked the question of [Gen. George] Casey and others, we asked it of Marine commanders in Anbar. Do you need additional troops? They all said the same thing: we don’t need additional troops at this point; we need to get the Iraqis to assume the responsibility they’re supposed to assume.
In November, after the election, CentCom commander Gen. John Abizaid rejected the notion of a so-called surge, saying that he “met with every divisional commander, Gen. Casey, the core commander, Gen. Dempsey” and asked them if bringing “in more American troops now, [would] add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq and they all said, ‘No.'”
Indeed, Bush fired Casey, in large part because he neglected to tell the president what he wanted to hear.
And yet, here we are, just a few months later, watching Bush brag about how his policy followed the advice of the generals — which is “what you want your President doing.” Please.
Maybe this is the president’s way of passing the buck — “Sure, the policy is failing, but it’s not all my fault!” — but for those of us who haven’t completely forgotten the last half-year, it’s not going to work.