We’ve all seen the YouTube clip this week — it was hard to avoid — but Dick Cheney’s pre-2002 perspective on occupying Iraq deserve to be fleshed out in a little more detail.
At the outset, let’s remember the political and historical context. After H.W. Bush ended the Gulf War, leaving Saddam Hussein in power, the administration was a little defensive about the strategy. Cheney, Bush’s Defense Secretary, would frequently defend the decision to leave Saddam in place.
In 1991, Cheney noted the intense sectarian rivalries that dominate Iraqi society and the likely inability to maintain stability in Baghdad. As for replacing Saddam with a democracy, Cheney asked his audience, “How much credibility is that government going to have if it’s set up by the United States military when it’s there?” He added:
“The notion that we ought to now go to Baghdad and somehow take control of the country strikes me as an extremely serious one in terms of what we’d have to do once we got there. You’d probably have to put some new government in place. It’s not clear what kind of government that would be, how long you’d have to stay. For the U.S. to get involved militarily in determining the outcome of the struggle over who’s going to govern in Iraq strikes me as a classic definition of a quagmire.”
Then, in 1994, Cheney reiterated his position.
“Once you got to Iraq and took it over, and took down Saddam Hussein’s government, then what are you going to put in its place? That’s a very volatile part of the world and if you take down the central government in Iraq, you can easily end up seeing pieces of Iraq fly off. How many additional dead Americans is Saddam worth? And our judgment was – not very many and I think we got it right.”
As ThinkProgress noted this morning, Cheney was repeating the line as recently as 2000:
“[T]he only way you could have done that would be to go to Baghdad and occupy Iraq. If we’d done that, the U.S. would have been all alone. We would not have had the support of the coalition, especially of the Arab nations that fought alongside us in Kuwait. None of them ever set foot inside Iraq. Conversations I had with leaders in the region afterwards–they all supported the decision that was made not to go to Baghdad.
“They were concerned that we not get into a position where we shifted instead of being the leader of an international coalition to roll back Iraqi aggression to one in which we were an imperialist power, willy-nilly moving into capitals in that part of the world taking down governments.”
That Cheney sure was smart, wasn’t he?
But let’s take this a step further and consider why all of this is problematic.
First, the excuses so far are laughable. A CBS affiliate asked the Office of the Vice President for comment on the difference between the old Cheney and the new Cheney. A spokesperson would only say: “He was not Vice President at the time; it was after he was Secretary of Defense. I don’t have any comment.”
Well, that’s not much of an argument. Vice President Cheney likes quagmires, but Defense Secretary Cheney doesn’t? Maybe we can get these two together for a chat?
When this came up on The Daily Show the other day with Cheney sycophant Stephen Hayes, the Weekly Standard writer went with the ol’ “9/11 changed everything” line. But this, too, is unpersuasive. The conditions didn’t change in Iraq at all; everything Cheney said before taking office was still true after 9/11. (Stewart told him, 9/11 “didn’t change the space-time continuum.”)
But I think something’s been missing from the debate this week. We’ve all had a good laugh seeing how spot-on correct Cheney was before he started screwing up, and we’ve all rolled our eyes at the “9/11 changed everything” argument, but it’s worth taking the argument one step further. The problem is not just that Cheney went from being right to being wrong, it’s that he knew exactly what to expect from invading Iraq, but he sold the nation a bill of goods.
In other words, Cheney knew sectarian violence was inevitable; he knew it’d be a quagmire; he knew we’d lose international support; and he knew a U.S. occupation would further destabilize the Middle East. Cheney not only did it anyway, he didn’t say anything about his expectations. Just the opposite — he and his close allies said the war would be short, cheap, and easy.
That’s the point to take away from this week’s revelations.