For all its dissembling, the White House has actually been fairly clear about the purpose of Bush’s “surge” policy — more U.S. troops would lessen the daily violence in Iraq, which would in turn offer Iraqi political leaders some “breathing room” to achieve reconciliation. From there, sectarian conflicts would ease, and some semblance of stability would emerge.
It all sounds very nice, except the policy hasn’t worked, and nearly 10 months after the administration started implementing the surge, Iraq has actually slid backwards on political reconciliation.
Should we be more patient? If we give an ineffective policy more time, will it eventually produce the desired results? Not so much — even Iraqi officials now concede that political progress is impossible, and isn’t going to happen.
Iraqi leaders argue that sectarian animosity is entrenched in the structure of their government. Instead of reconciliation, they now stress alternative and perhaps more attainable goals: streamlining the government bureaucracy, placing experienced technocrats in positions of authority and improving the dismal record of providing basic services.
“I don’t think there is something called reconciliation, and there will be no reconciliation as such,” said Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd. “To me, it is a very inaccurate term. This is a struggle about power.”
Humam Hamoudi, a prominent Shiite cleric and parliament member, said any future reconciliation would emerge naturally from an efficient, fair government, not through short-term political engineering among Sunnis and Shiites.
A month ago today, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said we would see “a major breakthrough” within “weeks” on political reconciliation in Iraq, which he believes is unfolding at “breakneck speed.” Once again, Lindsey Graham apparently doesn’t know what he’s talking about.
As Kevin concluded, “If reconciliation depends on the emergence of efficient, fair government in Iraq, that’s pretty much all she wrote. It’s time to pack up and go home.”
It’s dejecting, but we can stay in Iraq for decades, put thousands of U.S. troops’ lives on the line, invest hundreds of billions of dollars, and help al Qaeda with recruiting and fundraising, and it won’t make any difference towards achieving Bush’s stated goals.
The acrimony among politicians has strained the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki close to the breaking point. Nearly half of the cabinet ministers have left their posts. The Shiite alliance in parliament, which once controlled 130 of the 275 seats, is disintegrating with the defection of two important parties.
Legislation to manage the oil sector, the country’s most valuable natural resource, and to bring former Baath Party members back into the government have not made it through the divided parliament. The U.S. military’s latest hope for grass-roots reconciliation, the recruitment of Sunni tribesmen into the Iraqi police force, was denounced last week in stark terms by Iraq’s leading coalition of Shiite lawmakers.
“There has been no significant progress for months,” said Tariq al-Hashimi, one of Iraq’s two vice presidents and the most influential Sunni politician in the country. “There is a shortage of goodwill from those parties who are now in the driver’s seat of the country.”
Indeed, Iraqis don’t even agree on what “reconciliation” means.
One Iraqi official conceded that “Humpty Dumpty had a fall and cannot be put back together again.” Our ongoing presence won’t produce our goal. Time to go.