Obviously, anyone watching events in Iraq has to be pleased with the military progress. In recent months, there’s been a decline in the number of fatalities, casualties, and bombings, all of which have offered a glimmer of hope after nearly five years of failure, incompetence, and disaster.
But the talk in most conservative circles that the war is effectively over, and that Bush’s “surge” policy has somehow solved Iraq’s problems, is more than just overly optimistic; it’s actually foolish.
The NYT’s Alissa Rubin has a very good piece today explaining the genesis of the encouraging developments, and more importantly, why the military progress can turn on a dime without the original purpose of the surge — political progress.
Officials attribute the relative calm to a huge increase in the number of Sunni Arab rebels who have turned their guns on jihadists instead of American troops; a six-month halt to military action by the militia of a top Shiite leader, Moktada al-Sadr; and the increased number of American troops on the streets here.
They stress that all of these changes can be reversed, and on relatively short notice. The Americans have already started to reduce troop levels and Mr. Sadr, who has only three months to go on his pledge, has issued increasingly bellicose pronouncements recently.
The Sunni insurgents who turned against the jihadists are now expecting to be rewarded with government jobs. Yet, so far, barely 5 percent of the 77,000 Sunni volunteers have been given jobs in the Iraqi security forces, and the bureaucratic wheels have moved excruciatingly slowly despite government pledges to bring more Sunnis in.
Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq analyst at the International Crisis Group, explained the broader dynamic nicely: “The military solution has gained enough peace to last through the U.S. election, but we have a situation that is extremely fragile. None of the violent actors have either been defeated or prevailed, and the political roots of the conflict have not been addressed, much less resolved.”
The point here isn’t to deny the encouraging news. A reduction in violence and bloodshed is clearly a positive sign of conditions in Iraq. Rather, the point is we’re not looking at a new normal — we’re looking at a temporary respite. It’s absurd to think Iraq can just skate along, indefinitely, under the status quo.
Mr. Sadr was able to pull his militias back in large part because his community of poor Shiites was no longer under attack by Sunni militants. But if the broader Sunni population is not integrated into the new Shiite-dominated power structure, it is likely that the old divisions will rapidly resurface as the United States reduces its troop levels. If that happens, extremist Sunnis will renew their assaults on Shiites and Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia will respond in kind.
The government has a limited amount of time to integrate these formerly renegade Sunnis, said Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni and one of Iraq’s two vice presidents. The men want jobs, respect, and above all a guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for their past activities with the insurgency, he said, a concession that the Shiite majority government has given little indication it will make.
Stay tuned.