I’ve seen some arguments that Hillary Clinton’s victory in New Hampshire isn’t that surprising. Polls showed her with enormous leads in the state throughout 2007 — and as far back as 2006. That she managed to beat Barack Obama by five three points will help get her campaign back on track, but to characterize this as some kind of miraculous “comeback” is a bit of a stretch. She won where she was supposed to win.
The argument is not without merit, but I think this approach sells Clinton short. No one thought she could win. None of the campaigns, none of the pollsters, none of the experts, none of the locals — no one. Bill and Hillary assumed she would lose, as did the entire Clinton campaign staff.
This wasn’t one of those situations in which the campaign was saying, “Nobody believes us, but we’re going to do really well on Tuesday.” Just the opposite. Team Clinton not only expected to lose, they’d already started making post-defeat arrangements, including a minor staff shake-up that began yesterday afternoon.
And why not assume an Obama victory? His crowds in New Hampshire were not only huge, they were the biggest crowds anyone has ever seen in the state during a primary fight. His closing arguments were amazing. He had more volunteers and, thanks to a post-Iowa bounce, he led in literally every poll, as of yesterday morning. It’s not as if pundits were guessing; Obama really was in position to deliver.
But that obviously didn’t occur. What happened? How does a candidate trail by double digits on Sunday, and then win on Tuesday? Given a complex campaign dynamic, it wasn’t just one factor or event that moved the race in Clinton’s favor, but more likely, a combination of elements.
Here’s a rough sketch of the various factors, though I’m almost certain to miss a few:
The “Bradley Effect” — There’s been a phenomenon for years in which African-American candidates underperform against their poll numbers, because of what some have labeled the “Bradley Effect,” whereby white voters are embarrassed to admit to pollsters that they don’t support a black candidate. This strikes me as an unlikely explanation for Clinton’s victory, but there’s ample speculation about this in political circles today.
Going negative works — The Clinton campaign didn’t have much time after Iowa, but it immediately went negative on Obama, attacking him from a variety of directions, on everything from taxes to abortion to the 2005 energy bill. I thought this made the Clinton team look kind of desperate, and the barrage of unfocused attacks would start to wash each other out, but it’s certainly possible the negative campaigning shifted some undecided voters.
Saturday night’s debate — It’s inevitable to look for specific events that might have turned the tide in Clinton’s favor, and the only major event between the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary was the debate on Saturday night. I’ve seen some suggestions that Clinton benefited from Obama and Edwards “ganging up on her.” I think that’s wrong — Obama didn’t go negative at all; he didn’t have to — but if that was the perception, then it very well may have helped.
Media backlash — Isn’t it possible that flinty New Hampshire Dems decided they didn’t like the media picking the winner for them?
The pollsters stink — All of them? More than a half-dozen pollsters surveying one small state at the same time, and they’re all incompetent? While getting the Republican primary exactly right?
The Tears — It seems, at first glance, utterly ridiculous to think Hillary Clinton getting choked up on Monday might have propelled her to victory on Tuesday. And yet, it was the biggest political moment of the last several days, got wall-to-wall coverage in the media, drew a wildly inappropriate response from John Edwards, and may very well have contributed to some sympathy for Clinton. Keep in mind, women backed Obama in Iowa, but women backed Hillary in New Hampshire. (Before Clinton supporters argue, “It’s absurd to credit The Tears for Hillary’s success,” note that campaign chairman Terry McAuliffe credited the emotional moment for at least contributing to the victory.)
Let me add, as an aside, that some of this analysis may, on its face, seem silly. Why did one candidate beat another candidate? Because voters liked the winner better. It’s not rocket science.
But given the circumstances, there’s much more to this. It’s rare — indeed, it’s arguably unprecedented — to see this kind of surprise. Given this, it’s not unreasonable for political observers to tilt their heads and ask, “Huh?”