Matt Bai wrote a fascinating item yesterday for the New York Times Magazine on what he calls “The Framing Wars.” It was the latest in a series of articles on George Lakoff, “Don’t Think of an Elephant!,” and the left’s embrace of a strategy for the future that centers around a more effective use of language as a resource.
I’m not entirely convinced that Lakoff’s approach to framing is the Holy Grail for Dems, but there’s one thing in Bai’s article that deserves special attention: Dems’ new-found appreciation for message discipline. Bai pointed, for example, to the way in which they approach the fight over the nuclear option.
In January, Geoff Garin conducted a confidential poll on judicial nominations, paid for by a coalition of liberal advocacy groups. He was looking for a story — a frame — for the filibuster that would persuade voters that it should be preserved, and he tested four possible narratives. Democratic politicians assumed that voters saw the filibuster fight primarily as a campaign to stop radically conservative judges, as they themselves did. But to their surprise, Garin found that making the case on ideological grounds — that is, that the filibuster prevented the appointment of judges who would roll back civil rights — was the least effective approach. When, however, you told voters that the filibuster had been around for over 200 years, that Republicans were “changing rules in the middle of the game” and dismantling the “checks and balances” that protected us against one-party rule, almost half the voters strongly agreed, and 7 out of 10 were basically persuaded. It became, for them, an issue of fairness.
Garin then convened focus groups and listened for clues about how to make this case. He heard voters call the majority party “arrogant.” They said they feared “abuse of power.” This phrase struck Garin.
So, what did Dems do with this? They did something they usually either fail to do or do badly: craft a persuasive message and stick to it.
[Stephanie Cutter] used Garin’s research to create a series of talking points intended to cast the filibuster as an American birthright every bit as central to the Republic as Fourth of July fireworks. The talking points began like this: “Republicans are waging an unprecedented power grab. They are changing the rules in the middle of the game and attacking our historic system of checks and balances.” They concluded, “Democrats are committed to fighting this abuse of power.”
Cutter’s war room began churning out mountains of news releases hammering daily at the G.O.P.’s “abuse of power.” In an unusual show of discipline, Democrats in the Senate and House carried laminated, pocket-size message cards — “DEMOCRATS FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY, AGAINST ABUSE OF POWER,” blared the headline at the top — with the talking points on one side and some helpful factoids about Bush’s nominees on the other. During an appearance on “This Week With George Stephanopoulos” in April, Senator Charles Schumer of New York needed all of 30 seconds to invoke the “abuse of power” theme — twice.
By the time Reid took to the airwaves in late May, on the eve of what looked to be a final showdown on the filibuster (“This abuse of power is not what our founders intended,” he told the camera solemnly), the issue seemed pretty well defined in the public mind. In a typical poll conducted by Time magazine, 59 percent of voters said they thought the G.O.P. should be stopped from eliminating the filibuster.
Terrific. Dems needed a message, found out which one worked best, and hammered it home. The result wasn’t perfect — the Gang of 14’s compromise effectively ended the fight — but considering the 55-45 advantage the GOP enjoys, and the support for the nuclear option among the Republican base, the message strategy was largely a success. People didn’t buy the GOP argument.
Was this framing? I’m not entirely sure; the word seems to mean different things to different people. It sounds more like message development, or “crafting” if you prefer, whereby one comes up with memorable phrases and sound-bites that resonate with the public.
But here’s the thing: I don’t care what it’s called. Dems on the Hill, if Bai’s article is right, have fallen in love with the idea of framing in general and George Lakoff in specific. If this strategy has helped them create credible, convincing messages — that lawmakers will actually stick to — they can label it anything they want to. I’ll just call it a good idea.