Knight Ridder had an interesting piece today on the [tag]Bush[/tag] [tag]administration[/tag]’s approach to [tag]diplomacy[/tag], or in the case of countries we don’t like, lack thereof.
Last month, the chief U.S. negotiator with North Korea wanted to meet privately with his North Korean counterpart, hoping he could persuade Pyongyang to return to talks on eliminating its nuclear weapons program.
But the meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Premier Kim Kye Gwan on the sidelines of a conference in Tokyo never took place.
Hill’s superiors in Washington forbade him from talking directly to the North Koreans, said three U.S. officials, a conference participant and another knowledgeable expert. All requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
The Bush administration also is refusing to talk directly with Iran about its nuclear program, with Syria about Middle East security and the infiltration of terrorists into Iraq, and, like Europe, with the Palestinian government led by Hamas, which it considers a terrorist organization.
It’s apparently diplomacy through silence. Reagan sat down with Gorbachev (he of the “evil empire”), but Bush won’t engage in diplomatic talks with any of the regimes he disapproves of. It’s more than a flawed strategy; it’s counterproductive and probably dangerous.
The administration’s approach may stem from the belief that the United States does not negotiate with terrorists, and when it comes to a Palestinian government led by Hamas, the administration may have a point. But the problem is we’re dealing with an international landscape with heads of state who aren’t inclined to change when we offer neither a carrot nor a stick. Silence, apparently, isn’t much of a bargaining ploy.
“I believe that diplomacy is not simply meant for our friends. It is meant for our enemies,” said Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state in President Bush’s first term. “In fact, our enemies need diplomatic engagement more. We ought to have sufficient self-confidence in the correctness of our policy and the ability of our diplomats.”
And how does the administration respond? State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “You don’t want to do the expedient thing. You want to do the right thing, the thing that’s effective.”
I’m inclined to agree with the sentiment, but reality keeps getting in the way. We won’t talk to [tag]Iran[/tag], or [tag]North Korea[/tag], or [tag]Syria[/tag], or [tag]Hamas[/tag], but they’re still there, and in most instances, getting more dangerous as times goes on, not less. How, exactly, is this “effective”?
Consider this terrific observation Kevin Drum raised a couple of weeks ago.
It started on May 6, 2003, shortly after George Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq. On that day the Associated Press reported without elaboration that Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman had confirmed that “Iran has exchanged messages with U.S. officials about Iraq through the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Tehran. He declined to give details.”
It turns out, Iran was more-than-a-little worried that U.S. forces might make a right turn after the fall of Baghdad, and was ready to start discussions to help “resolve” U.S.-Iranian differences. Bush wasn’t interested and turned Iran down. Since then, the Iranian [tag]nuclear[/tag] threat has gone up, as has the chance of the administration considering a [tag]military[/tag] confrontation.
Maybe Sean McCormack can explain how this is “the thing that’s effective.”