The fact that the president and military leaders are divided on how best to proceed in Iraq would be noteworthy under any circumstances, but it’s particularly striking given that Bush has sworn for years that he would not second guess the top military brass. “It’s important to trust the judgment of the military when they’re making military plans,” he told the Washington Post in an interview last month. “I’m a strict adherer to the command structure.”
The president can reject their advice — civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle — but the way in which Bush is blowing off the generals’ advice on Iraq is unusual.
When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against. […]
It may also be a sign of increasing assertiveness from a commander in chief described by former aides as relatively passive about questioning the advice of his military advisers. In going for more troops, Bush is picking an option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea almost since the time of the invasion.
“It seems clear to me that the president has taken more positive control of this strategy,” said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), one of those pushing for more troops.
Great. Bush is making decisions on his own now, like that’s supposed to make us feel better.
According to the WaPo piece, there’s even a new slogan: “the president will explain ‘that we have to go up before we go down.'”
The sales pitch notwithstanding, we’re still looking at a dynamic in which the commanders are convinced Bush is wrong….
We sat down with military commanders there and here, and none of them said that additional troops would solve the fundamental cause of violence, which was the absence of national reconciliation. We always asked if additional troops were needed. We asked the question of [Gen. George] Casey and others, we asked it of Marine commanders in Anbar. Do you need additional troops? They all said the same thing: we don’t need additional troops at this point; we need to get the Iraqis to assume the responsibility they’re supposed to assume.
…as do the troops trying to train an Iraqi army.
Five days with American trainers assigned to Muqdadiyah found the Iraqi army there divided, sectarian, underfunded, cold and hungry. It lacks equipment, motivation and a common belief in its mission. The old guard is suspicious of the American Army, which defeated them and now trains them. The young guard is suspicious of the old guard.
….The American trainers said teaching counterinsurgency doctrine had become secondary to more basic pursuits, such as how to load a weapon, take care of equipment and even find basic supplies: food, water and bullets. In U.S commanders’ sparse offices and barracks, piles of books on counterinsurgency tactics sit unused behind desks.
I wonder just how strong Bush thinks his credibility really is.