We noted earlier that Bush’s “new way forward” in Iraq is drawing criticisms from Shiites, who don’t care for the administration’s orders, and the Sunnis, who believe they’ll receive the brunt of the crackdown on Iraqi violence.
Fareed Zakaria noted this week that it’s the Sunnis who have the most to lose right now. (via Kevin Drum)
If the 20,000 additional American troops being sent to the Iraqi capital focus primarily on Sunni insurgents, there’s a chance the Shiite militias might get bolder. Colonel Duke puts it bluntly: “[The Mahdi Army] is sitting on the 50-yard line eating popcorn, watching us do their work for them.”
So what will happen if Bush’s new plan “succeeds” militarily over the next six months? Sunnis will become more insecure as their militias are dismantled. Shiite militias will lower their profile on the streets and remain as they are now, ensconced within the Iraqi Army and police. That will surely make Sunnis less likely to support the new Iraq. Shiite political leaders, on the other hand, will be emboldened. […]
The greatest danger of Bush’s new strategy, then, isn’t that it won’t work but that it will — and thereby push the country one step further along the road to all-out civil war…. The U.S. Army will be actively aiding and assisting in the largest program of ethnic cleansing since Bosnia. Is that the model Bush wanted for the Middle East?
That last question is a good one. The answer, I suspect, is that it very well may be the model Cheney wants.
Consider the broader dynamic: Bush is sending troops in to deal with Sunni insurgents, while leaving the Shiite militias to the Shiite government, which may or may not follow through.
There are Middle East experts better versed on this than I am, but isn’t this awfully close to what Cheney had in mind with the “80 percent solution”?
As you may recall, in late November, the Bush gang leaked word that some administration officials support the “80 percent solution,” which would basically push the U.S. into taking take sides in the civil war, and back the Shiite majority over the Sunni minority.
A couple of weeks later, we learned that Cheney was advocating just such an approach.
On the political front, the administration is focusing increasingly on variations of a “Shiite tilt,” sometimes called an “80 percent solution,” that would bolster the political center of Iraq and effectively leave in charge the Shiite and Kurdish parties that account for 80 percent of Iraq’s 26 million people and that won elections a year ago.
Vice President Cheney’s office has most vigorously argued for the “80 percent solution,” in terms of both realities on the ground and the history of U.S. engagement with the Shiites, sources say. A source familiar with the discussions said Cheney argued this week that the United States could not again be seen to abandon the Shiites, Iraq’s largest population group, after calling in 1991 for them to rise up against then-President Saddam Hussein and then failing to support them when they did. Thousands were killed in a huge crackdown.
Granted, the new policy is not exactly in line with the “80 percent solution,” and we’re not literally taking sides in the civil war. But doesn’t Zakaria’s description sound familiar? If the Mahdi Army is “sitting on the 50-yard line eating popcorn, watching us do their work for them,” isn’t that effectively the same thing as taking sides? If we, advertently or not, end up “actively aiding and assisting in the largest program of ethnic cleansing since Bosnia,” isn’t this a de facto enforcement of the “80 percent solution”?
Given this, if Bush’s plan fails, it’s awful. And if Bush’s plan succeeds, that could be nearly as problematic.