Everyone’s heard the now-famous exchange between Gen. John Abizaid and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) from November, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing about sending more troops. What’s sometimes overlooked, however, was the second part of Abizaid’s comments.
The general told McCain, “I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the core commander, General Dempsey, we all talked together. And I said, ‘In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?’ And they all said, ‘No.'” And why were they all in agreement? “[W]e want the Iraqis to do more,” Abizaid said. “It is easy for the Iraqis to rely upon to us do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.”
As Think Progress noted this morning, it’s exactly what the president believed as recently as June 2005.
“Some Americans ask me, if completing the mission is so important, why don’t you send more troops? If our commanders on the ground say we need more troops, I will send them. But our commanders tell me they have the number of troops they need to do their job. Sending more Americans would undermine our strategy of encouraging Iraqis to take the lead in this fight. And sending more Americans would suggest that we intend to stay forever, when we are, in fact, working for the day when Iraq can defend itself and we can leave.”
Sure, it’s obvious that the president is contradicting himself, and it makes for an amusing juxtaposition to contrast Bush’s comments then with Bush’s comments now.
But there’s more to this than just the “gotcha.”
The point is the president had a clearly articulated vision for how to help improve Iraqi security forces in June 2005 — ask Iraqis to step up more, and rely on U.S. forces less. Now he appears to believe the opposite.
That, in and of itself, is not necessarily a problem. Circumstances change, policies adapt. Fine. But it’s incumbent upon the president to explain the evolution of his thinking on this. Why would additional U.S. troops be a disaster for Iraq in June 2005, but be great for Iraq now? Why would it send a signal to Iraqis that “we intend to stay forever” then, but not send that signal now? Or do we no longer care?
If sending more U.S. troops was going to undermine our strategy of improving Iraqi security forces, how will it affect the goal now? Does that no longer matter?
As Atrios put it:
I suppose it would be too much to ask to have someone get a coherent explanation about why more troops then was a bad idea but more troops now is a good idea.
I care about the president flip-flopping (again), but I care even more about getting some basic answers. Bush can believe that more troops would be awful, and he can believe more troops would be helpful, but he can’t believe both without some kind of justification for the change.
I don’t think he has one. I guess we’ll find out for sure on Wednesday night.