I distinctly remember the Democratic Party’s attitude — at both the leadership and grassroots level — in advance of the 1992 presidential election. At the time, the party faithful wanted, more than anything else, to find a “winner.”
We had suffered too many embarrassing defeats to look at the ’92 field and think about ideology; it was about who could beat Bush (the first one) on Election Day. Truth be told, Bill Clinton was far more moderate than the party’s base in 1992, but the liberal rank-and-file loved Dukakis, Mondale, and McGovern and look what it got them. They looked at Clinton, appreciated his political skills, and said, “Good enough.”
When you think about it, going into ’92, there hadn’t been a Dem nominee that the party could confidently view as a winner since Johnson in ’64. (Carter in ’76? Not so much.)
Things have changed, for the better, since then. The last three presidential elections have gone pretty well for the party, despite the current occupant of the Oval Office. More voters chose the Dem ticket over the GOP ticket in ’92, ’96, and 2000 — the first time since the 1940s that the Dems have achieved that feat three elections in a row.
For some, I’m afraid this “success” has gone to their head. A significant portion of the party’s supporters are struggling over whether pragmatism should even be considered at all when it comes to choosing among the primary field. I happen to think this is insane, but they’re not asking me.
No where is this question more relevant than in the Howard Dean debate.
The fact that there’s even such a thing as the “Howard Dean debate” is somewhat bizarre. He’s one of the nine candidates seeking the Dem nomination, but none of the other eight have been the subject of so much speculation about viability. No one, for example, to my knowledge, has posed the question, “What should Democrats do about Dick Gephardt?”
For most Dem voters, to know Dean is to love Dean. They’re angry; he’s angry. They hate Republicans and everything they stand for; Dean does too. They want a candidate who won’t pull any punches when it comes to taking on the right-wingers, and Dean never misses an opportunity to do just that.
Dean’s “storyline” is a mixed bag. On the one hand, he’s an experienced governor (and governors have done far better in presidential elections than congressmen) with a strong record of fiscal conservatism (balanced budgets without big tax increases). On the other hand, he has no military or foreign policy experience, he has a bad temper and a propensity to pop-off, he attacks Democrats with almost the same frequency as he does Republicans, and his social liberalism on issues such as abortion and gay rights suggests he won’t do real well south of the Mason-Dixon line.
I get the impression that most Dems fall into two camps: those who like Dean, think he can beat Bush, and are supporting him enthusiastically vs. those who like Dean, think he’d lose badly to Bush, and think his mere nomination would set the party back for years.
I’ve been thinking about exploring both sides in some detail for weeks now, but I’m pleased to see that I no longer have to — The New Republic has done it for me.
The current issue features a picture of Angry Dean with a headline, “Must He Be Stopped?” It is not a rhetorical question. To delve into answering this question, the magazine features two detailed articles — one by Jonathan Cohn saying Dean is a moderate New Democrat who could win in ’04 and the other by Jonathan Chait saying the opposite.
I’ll go over Chait’s anti-Dean thesis today and Cohn’s on Monday. They’re both worth reading if you’re considering supporting Dean in the primaries.
Chait begins by noting that every conservative in DC, from Karl Rove to the editors of the Weekly Standard and the National Review, seems anxious for Dean to get the nomination. That, of course, is not a good sign.
Chait goes on to note that Dean has “attracted a cultlike following although it is largely confined to liberals. Dean is soaring mainly because he has tapped into the intense anger Democrats feel toward Bush. But, in this case, anger has gotten the better of reason.”
Though Dean frequently tells audiences that he is the true voice of the party while his rivals are either “Bush-lite,” when they’re trying to sound moderate, or “Dean-lite” when they’re trying to sound liberal, Chait’s not buying it. On issues ranging from health care to taxes, Dean is right in line with his competitors, with some far more liberal on the issues than he is.
The difference, Chait says, is foreign policy in general and the war in Iraq in specific, which Chait sees as a “massive liability” for Dean. Some may argue that Dean’s opposition to a war that isn’t going well may boost his chances. Chait thinks success in Iraq isn’t the point; after all, “the unpopularity of the Vietnam War hardly made George McGovern’s dovishness more politically successful.”
For Chait it’s about public perception of weakness against foreign enemies, which he believes is a heavy weight around Dean’s neck. As Chait explained, Dean’s approach to international security is decidedly dovish. In a foreign policy speech last month, he called on the United States to “lead by example, not by force.” In April, he said, “We’ve gotten rid of [Saddam Hussein], and I suppose that’s a good thing.” These are the kinds of things the Republicans can and would use like a club to beat Dean in a general election.
Lastly, there’s the question of Dean’s campaign and its effect on the party. When Dean emphasizes, as he does regularly, that many Dem voters are “as angry at their own party as they are with Republicans,” Chait sees a divisive politics that severely damages Dems’ long-term prospects.
“One of the most difficult tasks parties face is convincing their activist bases to compromise in order to win,” Chait explains. “Even some of his critics have credited Dean with generating enthusiasm among the rank and file, but it’s a negative kind of enthusiasm. When Dean says Democrats are angrier at their own party than they are at the GOP, he’s identifying a severe political liability — one that he’s aggravating. If Dean does not win the nomination, he will have nurtured that sense of grievance among the Democratic base.”
Chait added, “Dean has said he will endorse whomever ultimately wins the primary. But his attacks upon the Democratic mainstream (particularly his view of political compromise as a kind of character flaw) will make his supporters all the more amenable to the liberal purity of another spoiler campaign by Nader…. [T]he primary effect of Dean’s insurgent run will be to make it harder for his party’s eventual nominee to adopt a broadly popular platform without disappointing the activist base. And, without doing that, no Democrat can deny George W. Bush another — potentially catastrophic — four years. No wonder Karl Rove is chortling.”
I’ll give you my take on the other side, by Jonathan Cohn, next week, but I have to admit, Chait’s arguments are awfully persuasive.