A week from today, Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will tell members of Congress how things are going in Iraq, making this week particularly important, at least as far as public relations goes. Of course, we need not wait for congressional testimony to know that the president’s “surge” policy has failed. It’s effectively beyond refutation.
The LAT has a pretty thorough report today summarizing just how little the Bush policy has achieved. The crisis of sectarian violence continues, the refugee crisis is getting worse, the war is spreading into new areas, political progress (the point of the surge) is non-existent, and laws that the administration expected to see Iraqi lawmakers pass by now are still a blank page. As the Times put it, “[A] review of statistics on death and displacement, political developments and the impressions of Iraqis who are living under the heightened military presence reaches a dispiriting conclusion.”
But that’s all right, the administration argues, because they have a new standard for success.
Now, military and government officials highlight progress on the local, neighborhood and even street level. Much of it hinges on the future of deals struck with former insurgents who until recently were aiming their guns at U.S. forces.
“There are . . . if you will, mini-benchmarks where things are happening,” U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker said Aug. 21. Crocker cited Anbar province, west of Baghdad, where violence has dropped substantially since Sunni Arab leaders there began working with U.S. and Iraqi security forces.
“We’ve seen that phenomenon in different forms move through different parts of the country,” Crocker said. “It’s the steps these tribes, communities, individuals are taking. . . . You’ve got to keep an eye on that too.”
Yes, the White House agreed to 18 specific benchmarks earlier this year to gauge the success of the latest in a series of Bush policies. At this point, the administration has come up short on 15 of them. So the new spin is, “Sure, we’ve failed on the big benchmarks, but we’re making headway on the mini-benchmarks. Now please give us another $200 billion.”
As political-misdirection tactics go, we’re watching an example being played on a grand scale.
What we’re seeing, in effect, is the beginning of yet another new administration policy. Officials aren’t characterizing it that way, but they’re actually conceding that the surge policy is an abject failure, and quietly introducing an entirely new approach at the 11th hour.
This policy says, “We’ve been at this all wrong, focusing on establishing a stable and effective government in Baghdad. From now on, we’ll emphasize local stability and wait for it to trickle up.” David Brooks is already on board.
Now, at long last, the smartest analysts and policy makers are starting to think like sociologists. They are finally acknowledging that the key Iraqi figures are not in the center but in the provinces and the tribes. Peace will come to the center last, not to the center first. Stability will come not through some grand reconciliation but through the agglomeration of order, tribe by tribe and street by street.
The big change in the debate has come about because the surge failed, and it failed in an unexpected way. The original idea behind the surge was that U.S. troops would create enough calm to allow the national politicians to make compromises. The surge was intended to bolster the “modern” — meaning nonsectarian and nontribal — institutions in the country.
But the surge is failing, at least politically, because there are practically no nonsectarian institutions, and there are few nonsectarian leaders to create them. Security gains have not led to political gains.
At the same time, something unexpected happened. As Iraqi national politics stagnated, the tribes began to take the initiative. The process started in Anbar Province, when the local tribes revolted against Al Qaeda. It has continued in Diyala Province and even in Baghdad neighborhoods like Ameriya. In the South, moderate Shiite parties have begun to resist the Sadrists, while in many places local groups that look like mafia families struggle to impose order on their turf.
In other words, organic local actors — some thuggish, some not — have begun to impose a security structure on parts of the country. Some are independent, some require assistance from the U.S. troops supplied by the surge.
I see. So, the “surge” is out, “bottom-up” is in. If it’s successful, Iraq will be an entirely segregated country, ruled by sectarian tribes and militias, all of whom hate their many rivals, governed by a federal administration that’s sectarian, corrupt, and incompetent. Best of all, the moment we leave, whenever that might be, none of these factions at the local or national level can (or even want to) work with one another.
Forget it. The surge was the last chance. It’s failed. Anyone who’s going to argue now that Iraq Policy 6.0 needs more time to work is fooling themselves.