Getting to the bottom of the Iraqi security forces — redux

Bush said we’d have 125,000 trained Iraqi security forces by the end of 2004, which wasn’t even close to true. Condi Rice insists there 120,000 are now trained, equipped, and ready to provide security, which is still wildly off-base. The Pentagon says there are 136,000 members of Iraqi security forces, but grudgingly notes that less than a third of them are ready to defend their country.

Since the strength and condition of these Iraqi forces is the integral ingredient to ending the United States’ role in the country, it’d be nice to know just how much the administration is exaggerating their numbers. The GAO is helping fill out the picture.

U.S. commanders and Bush administration officials are overstating the number of Iraqi security forces on duty, providing an inaccurate picture about the training mission that is the U.S. military’s exit strategy for Iraq, a government audit agency said Monday.

The Pentagon in its latest figures said 142,000 Iraqis had been trained as police and soldiers. But the Government Accountability Office said those figures include tens of thousands of Iraqi policemen who had left their jobs without explanation.

The GAO also said the State Department six months ago stopped providing government auditors with information about the number of Iraqi troops who have been issued flak vests, weapons and communications equipment.

So we don’t really know how big the Iraqi security forces are, we don’t know how much it’s costing us, and we don’t know how long it will take to get the situation on track.

And what we do know, aside from the fact that the administration is embellishing a lot, is pretty discouraging.

As Think Progress reported this morning, the GAO report paints an unflattering picture of the development of the highest American military priority in Iraq. Among the more disturbing revelations:

* U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. [p.2]

* The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who are absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. According to DOD officials, the number of absentees is probably in the tens of thousands. [p.8]

* Coalition leadership has yet to develop a system to assess the readiness of Iraqi military and police forces so they can identify weaknesses and provide them with effective support. [p.4]

* Recent reports indicate that some Iraqi security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For example, a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration of Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists. Police in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements. [p.17]

We’re going to be there a very long time. And we can pretty much discount the idea of reliable data from here on out.