Around the web today, you’ll find relatively sincere discussions comparing [tag]Bush[/tag] to Abraham [tag]Lincoln[/tag] in the lead up to the Civil War, to [tag]FDR[/tag], and to a Cold War [tag]dissident[/tag] fighting for democratic values.
Perhaps the most insightful comes by way of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who puts Bush’s approach to foreign policy in a historical context.
The issue of preventive war as a presidential prerogative is hardly new. In February 1848 Rep. Abraham Lincoln explained his opposition to the Mexican War: “Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose — and you allow him to make war at pleasure [emphasis added]. . . . If, today, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, ‘I see no probability of the British invading us’; but he will say to you, ‘Be silent; I see it, if you don’t.’ ”
This is precisely how George W. Bush sees his presidential prerogative: Be silent; I see it, if you don’t. However, both Presidents Harry S. [tag]Truman[/tag] and Dwight D. [tag]Eisenhower[/tag], veterans of the First World War, explicitly ruled out preventive war against Joseph Stalin’s attempt to dominate Europe. And in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy, himself a hero of the Second World War, rejected the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a preventive strike against the Soviet Union in Cuba.
Bush, obviously, changed American policy when he declared that the United States could strike first to “prevent” a war. Similar presidents have faced arguably more serious international challenges and resisted this unwise approach, but Bush, as he is wont to do, chose an unprecedented path.
But just as importantly, Schlesinger notes the substantive and strategic benefits from the more prudent road.
It was lucky that [tag]JFK[/tag] was determined to get the missiles out peacefully, because only decades later did we discover that the Soviet forces in Cuba had tactical nuclear weapons and orders to use them to repel a U.S. invasion. This would have meant a nuclear exchange. Instead, JFK used his own thousand days to give the American University speech, a powerful plea to Americans as well as to Russians to reexamine “our own attitude — as individuals and as a nation — for our attitude is as essential as theirs.” This was followed by the limited test ban treaty. It was compatible with the George Kennan formula — containment plus deterrence — that worked effectively to avoid a nuclear clash.
As Mahablog noted, “The difference between a real leader and statesman (JFK) and, um, Bush, is that JFK not only confronted the Soviets and the Cubans and got them to stand down without firing a shot; he used the incident to push for a limited test ban treaty. Bush and his rightie supporters, however, see war as their first and only option, not the last option. They know only how to destroy, not to build.”
Quite right. Schlesinger is genuinely concerned that the president, in light of his “doctrine,” may feel compelled to start a third Bush war. [tag]Schlesinger[/tag] concludes, “There is no more dangerous thing for a democracy than a foreign policy based on presidential preventive war.” It’s hard to disagree.