How we got from there to here

I usually don’t draw inspiration for commentary from the comics page of the paper, but Doonesbury isn’t really a cartoon, so it’s okay.

Without going into too much detail, today’s Doonesbury features a character, Ray Hightower, serving in Iraq. He mentions to his commanding officer, “A year ago, it hadn’t even occurred to anyone we needed to be teeing up countries for invasion.” But as the comic strip makes clear, it had occurred to at least some people.

I think Trudeau is right, the public face of the war with Iraq more or less materialized quickly last fall. A year ago at this time, we had troops in Afghanistan destroying the Taliban’s government, detaining suspected members of Al Qaeda, and searching caves for Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants. I wasn’t thinking much about Iraq, and chances are, neither were you.

But there were many strategists in the Bush administration who were thinking a great deal about Iraq, long before the attacks of 9/11. For many of us, it was the horror of terrorism, followed by the fear of anthrax, followed by a just and necessary war in Afghanistan. Then, in a transition so smooth it’s hard to remember, the focus shifted. Talk of bin Laden was out, equating Hussein and terrorism was in. International sympathy and support was out, “unilateral” attacks were in.

I’ve been thinking about how, exactly, we got to where we are today. The more I researched, the more I’ve come to appreciate the fact that the administration didn’t just wake up one morning and decide war against Iraq would be a good idea. An invasion was planned carefully, and unveiled methodically over many months. Consider this Carpetbagger Report timeline:

October 12, 2001 — The most important news story of the last two years about Iraq wasn’t noticed much the day it ran. Just one month and one day after the attacks of 9/11, the New York Times — on page 6 — reported that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, an administration hawk who has pushed for “regime change” in Iraq for several years, had begun crafting plans to remove Hussein from power, despite the fact that the war against Afghanistan had started less than a week earlier. The article noted that Wolfowitz was leading a “tight-knit group of Pentagon officials and defense experts outside government” that would begin “mobilizing support” for a new Iraq war as part of the “next phase of the war against terrorism.” R. James Woolsey, former director of central intelligence and part of Wolfowitz’s group, acknowledged that an Iraqi invasion may not be popular once it occurs, but that we must be “willing to put up with criticism from European states and other governments.” Little did he know at the time.

November 26, 2001 — The initial diplomatic work begins. President Bush tells reporters that U.N. weapons inspectors should be readmitted to Iraq without delay. When a reporter asks what the consequences would be if Hussein refused, Bush says, “He’ll find out.”

January 4, 2002 — The Wall Street Journal publishes an article that explains that most Arab leaders in the Middle East see an eventual U.S. attack on Iraq as “inevitable.” The article notes that “Arab countries are expected to fall into line once this happens.” In retrospect, their optimism seems almost quaint.

January 30, 2002 — The New York Times reports that “Saddam Hussein has now been pushed toward the top of Washington’s foreign policy agenda.” This, despite the fact that U.S. forces are still waging battles in Afghanistan and violence in Israel is escalating daily.

February 6, 2002 — The New York Times reports, “The Central Intelligence Agency has no evidence that Iraq has engaged in terrorist operations against the United States in nearly a decade, and the agency is also convinced that President Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or biological weapons to Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups.” The article notes that officials believe Hussein “has been reluctant to use terrorism again for fear of being detected.”

February 12, 2002 — USA Today reports that Bush is “lining up support from allies in the Middle East” for an attack on Iraq. The article does not mention that it’s not going well.

March 10, 2002 — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says in a television interview that Bush wants to “put the world on notice that the status quo with Saddam Hussein is unacceptable.”

March 13, 2002 — Almost exactly one year ago this week, Bush sends Vice President Cheney to visit with leaders throughout the Middle East to convince them that “regime change” in Iraq is in the world’s best interest. Cheney’s tour was an unqualified failure. Arab countries expressed sympathy for 9/11, but wondered why the Bush administration was pursuing war against Iraq instead of brokering peace between Israelis and Palestinians, which at the time was suffering through some of the most intense fighting in decades. On this day, Cheney met with the king of Jordan, who warned the vice president that “a U.S.-led move against Iraq could destabilize the region,” according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

April 28, 2002 — The New York Times reports — this time, on the front page — that the White House is “contemplating the use of 70,000 to 250,000 troops” to overthrow Hussein. Even at this point, talk of a strong international coalition is considered unlikely. “Other than troops from Britain, no significant contribution of allied forces is anticipated,” the article says. The predictions now seem prophetic.

June 1, 2002 — Bush outlines a new U.S. approach to using the military — the concept of preemption — in a commencement address at West Point. Though he doesn’t mention Iraq specifically, Bush argues that “containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”

June 24, 2002 — USA Today notes that many congressional leaders — in both parties — are “skeptical about the need for quick military action against Iraq and want President Bush to seek congressional approval first.” (Bush had hinted publicly that he may not need, and may not seek, Congress’ approval for military action in Iraq.) Even House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R) says, “Our focus should be Israel.” At the time, skepticism in moderation was tolerated. If Hastert raised similar questions now, he’d be removed from his post and labeled a “traitor” by his GOP colleagues.

July 11, 2002 — USA Today reports that “senior officials at the State Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies” have heard that the White House has concluded a major invasion of Iraq would “require” some kind of provocation from Hussein, such as evidence of a nuclear weapons program or hostile actions towards one of Iraq’s neighboring countries. The article explains that administration officials will focus on “smaller-scale options,” and not a major war, unless Hussein escalates the situation, which the White House believes would help generate new support from wavering allies. It appeared, at the time, that the administration didn’t want to launch an “unprovoked” war. I guess these concerns faded.

July 28, 2002 — The Washington Post reports that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as other senior officers at the Pentagon, believe war in Iraq should be avoided and that containment is working. They are ignored.

August 4, 2002 — Brent Scowcroft, chairman of Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and national security advisor to the first President Bush, says a U.S. invasion of Iraq could “turn the whole region into a cauldron and, thus, destroy the war on terrorism.” He, too, is ignored.

August 9, 2002 — The New York Times, in a larger story about diplomacy involving Iraq, notes that House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) believes that an “unprovoked” attack by the U.S. on Iraq would diminish international support for regime change and could strengthen Hussein’s hand. Armey later changed his mind and avoided criticisms of lending “aid and comfort” to the enemy.

August 21, 2002 — President Bush tells reporters that he’s a “patient man” and “will look at all options” for how to deal with Saddam. (He didn’t mention that “all options” meant he’d wage war whether anyone liked it or not.)

August 26, 2002 — Vice President Cheney, in a speech to a veterans’ group, lays out an aggressive, hawkish approach to Iraq. “What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness,” Cheney said, asserting his belief that Saddam is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. “We will not simply look away, hope for the best, and leave the matter for some future administration to resolve.” Though the administration has been demanding the return of U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq, Cheney dismissed their relevance, concluding that the inspectors “provide no assurance whatsoever.”

September 1, 2002 — Less than a week after Cheney argues that U.N. inspectors are useless, Colin Powell tells the BBC that inspectors are important. “The president has been clear that he believes weapons inspectors should return…. Iraq has been in violation of many U.N. resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. And so, as a first step, let’s see what the inspectors find. Send them back in.”

September 4, 2002 — Powell acknowledges to reporters what is painfully obvious to the rest of us — that there are “real” differences of opinion within the administration on how to deal with Iraq. The same day, Ari Fleischer tries to clear up confusion about the administration’s policy. “The policy of the United States is regime change, with or without inspectors,” said Fleischer. He quickly added, “The president believes the weapons inspectors need to be let back in.”

September 7, 2002 — White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card acknowledges that the administration may appear to be in disarray about Iraq and that recent criticisms have gone unanswered by White House officials. Card, however, insists this is all part of a deliberate strategy. “From a marketing point of view,” Card tells the New York Times, “you don’t introduce new products in August.”

September 8, 2002 — After meeting with U.K.’s Blair, Bush tells reporters, “I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied — finally denied access, a report came out of the Atomic — the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], that they were six months away from developing a [nuclear] weapon. I don’t know what more evidence we need.” Apparently, quite a bit more evidence, because Bush was wrong about the IAEA study. The IAEA said Iraq was six to 24 months from developing a nuclear weapon in 1991 — before the Gulf War — not in 1998 as Bush said. In attempting to correct the error, White House spokesperson Scott McClellan said Bush was actually talking about a 1991 IAEA report, which turned out not to exist.

September 10, 2002 — The Washington Post reports that the Bush administration still can’t find any evidence linking Hussein and Al Qaeda. The article says the CIA believes Iraq’s last terrorist plot was nine years ago, when Hussein planned to assassinate the first president Bush, but failed.

September 12, 2002 — The day that set us on our present course. Bush tells the U.N. that Iraq has violated a number of the body’s resolutions and that regime change is therefore justified. “We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions,” Bush said. “But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced — the just demands of peace and security will be met — or action will be unavoidable.”

From there, you know the rest. The House and Senate passed supportive resolutions and the U.N. sent inspectors back in under Resolution 1441. Hussein dragged his feet on complying with 1441, Bush couldn’t get U.N. support for an invasion, so he launched a war with a small “Coalition of the Willing.”