Iraq Policy 5.0

I argued yesterday that the White House, without admitting it, was trying to unveil a new Iraq policy just as the old one was failing. Officials aren’t willing to come right out and say so, but they’re actually conceding that the surge policy is an abject failure, and quietly introducing an entirely new approach at the 11th hour. Iraq Policy 5.0 is about emphasizing local progress, not national progress.

The NYT’s David Sanger spells out this ridiculous moving of the goalposts today.

With the Democratic-led Congress poised to measure progress in Iraq by focusing on the central government’s failure to perform, President Bush is proposing a new gauge, by focusing on new American alliances with the tribes and local groups that Washington once feared would tear the country apart.

That shift in emphasis was implicit in Mr. Bush’s decision to bypass Baghdad on his eight-hour trip to Iraq, stopping instead in Anbar Province, once the heart of an anti-American Sunni insurgency. By meeting with tribal leaders who just a year ago were considered the enemy, and who now are fighting Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a president who has unveiled four or five strategies for winning over Iraqis — depending on how one counts — may now be on the cusp of yet another.

It is not clear whether the Democrats who control Congress will be in any mood to accept the changing measures.

How on earth could anyone take these “changing measures” seriously? Consider the context here: in January, the Bush administration conceded that none of its previous measures has worked, so it was time for yet another new Iraq policy. Everyone, everywhere said this was the president’s last chance to get Iraq right. He got it wrong — on the 18 agreed upon benchmarks, which the White House came up with in the first place, Iraq has successfully completed three. The “surge” didn’t work.

Now, thanks to some dizzying rhetorical acrobatics, war supporters are left to argue a) the surge is working; b) the surge isn’t working; c) the surge might work if it had more time; d) the benchmarks matter; e) the benchmarks don’t matter; and f) none of this matters because there’s a new bottom-up strategy that will finally produce results. Best of all, war supporters are making all of these arguments at the same time.

Now, I suppose there might be some people who pause and ask, “Well, sure, Bush Iraq Policy I, II, III, IV, and V were all failures, but maybe this new strategy of focusing on local progress and mini-benchmarks might actually work. Maybe we ought to give it some time.”

Kevin Drum explains how terribly wrong this is.

There’s an awful lot to say about this beyond the obvious point that this goalpost moving is a pretty desperate attempt to dig up something — anything — positive to say about political reconciliation in Iraq. For starters, there’s the fact that the Anbar strategy is entirely accidental and we don’t truly control it. There’s the fact that one of the underlying goals of arming the Sunni tribes is a veiled desire to create an armed balance of power between Sunni and Shia that can’t possibly be stable. There’s the fact that we’re encouraging a de facto balkanization of the country. There’s the fact that even if this strategy is a good one, we don’t have anywhere near enough troops to make it work on a widespread basis. And finally, there’s the fact that the Shiite militias simply aren’t going to allow this strategy to spread to Baghdad….

[B]e aware that this is apparently the new talking point: national reconciliation doesn’t matter anymore. Tribal reconciliation is where the action is. We’ll let you know how it’s going six months from now.

Remember, this isn’t a criticism of the Bush administration’s failures; this is the Bush administration’s own response to their failures. They established their own benchmarks, then failed to meet them, then redefined their mission (again). Now, they want Congress to not only endorse this madness, but to write another $200 billion check to pay for it.

I don’t doubt that lawmakers will be dazzled by Gen. Petraeus’ political skills next week, but anyone who falls for this scheme is a fool.

“I don’t doubt that lawmakers will be dazzled by Gen. Petraeus’ political skills next week, but anyone who falls for this scheme is a fool.”

and i dare say that there are enough democrats in congress that meet this definition that those of us in the reality based community will be left standing there scratching our heads……

  • Steve, sadly, there are a lotta fools in DC. I’m with Atrios on this, the only Dems with a big enough pulpit to shape policy now are Clinton and Obama. Not Reid or Pelosi.

    Time to lead guys.

  • Now, they want Congress to not only endorse this madness, but to write another $200 billion check to pay for it.

    How can we afford to keep spending like this? Can you imagine pumping $200 billion into our own ecomomy? That would be very helpful! I heard they can’t update the screening devices at our airports because it would cost $10 Billion. They can’t fix the levys in New Orleans because it would cost $5 Billion. We can’t make coal mines safe because it would cost $1 Billion. What’s wrong with this picture?

    Somebody in congress has to start linking all this funding to our ability to pay. If we want to continue this occupation of a foreign country- the rich who are driving this crazy policy have got to be taxed to pay for it!

  • Can you imagine pumping $200 billion into our own ecomomy?

    No, not hardly. The mind reels. So much could be done.

    It’s absolutely sickening that we’re being made into a debtor nation (possibly for generations) simply to prop up an unworkable neocon fantasy.

  • anyone who falls for this scheme is a fool.

    True. But we have a bunch of people in congress who gave plans 1-4 a chance of succeeding, when they had all been warned by the smart people that these plans were also fool’s errands.

    So do the math.

  • The people moving the goal posts on $hrubs war are out in full force. Michael Gordon, author of Cobra II, was on Charlie Rose last night. Gordon must have been promised an entire wing in $hrub’s future library. Among the bullshit he dispensed, he said “I don’t think anyone has said it may take 9 or 10 years to stabilize Iraq.” General BetrayUs said exactly that. Gordon actually said Al Maliki was a member of the minority though the Shia are the majority in Iraq. Of course Gordon kept repeating that the Sunnis were making so much progress with their “bottom-up institutionalization”. Gordon said that Bremer misrepresented that $hrub approved disbanding the Iraqi army and that the decision was made by Bremer, the DOD and Rumsfeld and that the decision “wasn’t fully discussed in Washington” thereby shifting blame from the Dumbcider. Lastly, he said that $hrub landed in Anbar on his last photo-op visit to Iraq because it was to show that he was supporting the Sunni progress as opposed to taking an RPG up his ass if he landed in Baghdad. Charlie didn’t call him on any of it.

  • On September 5th, 2007 at 10:17 am, bee thousand said:

    It’s absolutely sickening that we’re being made into a debtor nation (possibly for generations) simply to prop up an unworkable neocon fantasy.

    Worth repeating.

  • And all this just to kill more people. I’m with Phoebe from another thread that I’m just so tired of the killing. And it’s not just soldiers and insurgents that are dying. It’s the civilian population that is getting murdered and maimed from this war. The nightly news should be filled with images of these people.

  • anyone who falls for this scheme is a fool.

    Yeah, well since AF-1 was seen on the tarmac in Mesopotamia, we know who’s fallen for this scheme already.

  • A friend and I shared an interesting thought experiment a few weeks ago. Setting aside Petraeus and Bush and all the rest for a moment, what evidence would we require to agree that staying in Iraq was the right course of action — and for how long would we be willing to stay?

    The object was to find out how much of our cynicism was based on past lies and mismanagement (we both opposed the invasion from the start) and how much was based on the situation as it stands today. Without going into details, the criteria we came up for staying was is a far cry from anything we’re likely to hear in the coming weeks. Still, it was a good exercise and I’d recommend it to anyone who feels the occasional need to reset their meters.

  • wait a minute, the surge is in Baghdad, and the “successes” are in Anbar, where the surge isn’t. Doesn’t this argue for withdrawal?

    am i oversimplifying this?

  • There’s a serious gap in the public’s understanding about the benchmarks, which are a set of political objectives, and the surge, which is a military tactic. Somehow believing a military tactic will directly impact political goals is a huge stretch of the imagination.

    Face it. The 18 benchmarks are goals best accomplished by diplomats armed with negotiating skills, administrators armed with an understanding of Middle Eastern culture or senior military advisors armed with a sense of tact and NOT by 20-year old soldiers armed with AR-15s.

    How did we expect a soldier out of boot camp to establish a constitutional review committee? Provide de-Baathification legislation? Ensure equitable distribution of oil revenues?Establish an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections? Stop Iraq’s political authorities from undermining Iraqi security forces?

    This is typical Bushian politics. Make some photo-ops, give some speeches and keep kicking the can down the road in the hopes that progress somehow appears on his own. Why does Bush think Anbar is a success? ‘Cause he didn’t do a damn thing to make it happen. The failure of the benchmarks is the failure of Bush’s leadership style, of his conservative viewpoint and of his general laziness as a human being.

    What is most galling about all of this is that W keeps putting people one third his age who are on their second or third rotation in a dangerous country into a situation where they are expected to do what George himself is responsible to accomplish. The only way Iraq will be solved is when an immature, lazy man is removed as Commander-in-Chief.

  • Here’s what the New York Times was saying about Maj. Gen. Petraeus on Sept 4, 2003:

    Other elements are the early deployment of a potent American force large enough to establish control, the quick establishment of new civil institutions, run by Iraqis, and a selective use of raids to capture hostile groups or individuals while minimizing the disruption to local civilians.

    Another factor has been an American commander who approached so-called nation-building as a central military mission and who was prepared to act while the civilian authority in Baghdad was still getting organized.

    An Army general who holds an advanced degree in international relations from Princeton, General Petraeus was steeped in nation-building before he arrived in Iraq. He served as the assistant chief of staff for operations for SFOR, the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia. His division is also well suited for its mission. Unlike an armored unit, it has lot of infantry soldiers — nearly 7,000 — to conduct foot patrols and stay in touch with the local population. It also has 250 helicopters to travel across northern Iraq.

    ”We walk, and walking has a quality of its own,” the general says. ”We’re like cops on the beat.”

    Under General Petraeus, the 101st established an Iraqi governing council for the city of Mosul and the larger Nineveh Province before L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, arrived in Baghdad.

    The 101st has also established an employment office for former Iraqi military officers, found grain silos for local farmers and trained the local police.

    So we were winning, huh?

    For being such a Bushie good boy Petraeus got his fourth star. And now he’s back four years later to shovel more of the same shit our way. Meanwhile the Quagmire Death Rate remains practically what it has been throughout the war, regardless of changes in strategy (rationale). The second chart on the referenced page shows an actual increase in monthly rates over the period since “Mission Accomplished” all those war-torn years ago (285 days more than WWII to be exact).

  • Autonomous tribal regions, weak and corrupt central government….

    So, now the goal is to turn Iraq into West Afghanistan?

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