Iraqis, Obama, and 2010

Following up on an item from this morning, the AP ran a story noting that Ali al-Dabbagh, the spokesperson for the Maliki government in Iraq, endorsed the idea of a U.S. withdrawal “by 2010.” The timeframe, the AP noted, is “similar to Obama’s proposal to pull back combat troops within 16 months.”

The AP piece did not, however, include any direct quotes. Fortunately, there’s a video.

Now, the audio isn’t great, and English isn’t Dabbagh’s first language, but he seems to say, “We are not talking about the timetable which has been used for the [U.S.] election. We are talking on a real timetable that Iraqis set.” When a reporter asked what that timetable would be, it sounded like Dabbagh said, “Up to 2010.”

By saying he’s making a distinction between Iraqi expectations and the U.S. presidential election, Dabbagh seems to be arguing that the Maliki government and Barack Obama have the same timeframe in mind, but that’s just a happy coincidence. Obama wants to have U.S. troops out by 2010, and Maliki wants U.S. troops out by 2010, but only because it’s a sound, sensible policy. Maliki’s support for the timetable is independent of Obama’s support for the same timetable.

Whatever. Frankly, it doesn’t much matter why Iraqi officials support Obama’s policy; it matters that they support Obama’s policy.

And given all of this, the media couldn’t possibly screw up the story, right? Well, there’s still the Washington Post….

Keep in mind, at this point, the Post is the nation’s only major daily newspaper not to run its own article devoted to Maliki and Obama sharing a withdrawal timetable. In other words, the WaPo’s recent coverage on this issue hasn’t been especially stellar. (The Post does have room today for the eighth chapter in its 13-part series on Chandra Levy’s murder seven years ago.)

Today, the WaPo did note the Maliki government’s Obama-like position on withdrawal — but only to note that Dabbagh “would like U.S. troops to withdraw by the end of 2010 — eight months later than Obama’s proposal.”

Got that? The campaign-changing event — the Maliki government’s support for Obama’s policy — is largely ignored, right up until the moment the Post emphasizes the notion that Maliki and Obama disagree.

What’s more, it’s not even clear if the Post is right. Reuters’ report noted that Dabbagh mentioned “the end of 2010” as “the appropriate time for the withdrawal.” The AP report quoted Dabbagh saying, “We are hoping that in 2010 that combat troops will withdraw from Iraq.”

Which is right? At this point, it’s not at all clear. But in a sense, it doesn’t much matter — either way, the Iraqi government fundamentally rejects John McCain’s policy and either embraces Obama’s approach, or comes awfully close.

I’m not saying that an eight-month difference is necessary trivial; it’s not. I am saying that McCain’s policy of an indefinite war followed by an indefinite presence that could last “100 years” is so far outside the realm of discussion here, it’s hard to take McCain’s policy seriously at all.

For the WaPo to emphasize the minor-if-existent differences between Maliki and Obama seems to wildly miss the point of these developments.

Here’s a basic question to ponder: I wonder if the Iraqis see the “end of the occupation” the way we do, with lots of American “advisors” still hanging around to make sure the flow of oil is not impaired terrists don’t take over the place.

Somehow I doubt it.

  • The WaPo can’t even do its math right. If a President Obama takes office Jan. 20, 2009, and immediately puts into motion a 16 month timetable, then the troops are out by the end of May, 2010. That’s seven, not eight, months before the end of 2010.

  • It’s designed to miss the point I think – that’s really all the corporate media can do with this story (to help McCain).

  • I heard “end of 2010” in that clip, but I agree that it doesn’t much matter. The important point is the setting of a timetable for leaving, not the specific date or whether or not it gets moved backwards or forwards as circumstances change.

    The American people, Iraqi people, and now the Iraqi government are all united in wanting American troops leave Iraq… and both Maliki and Obama are in the same ballpark, and so should be able to negotiate, with the advice of military commanders, a specific time line and benchmarks to be me etc.

  • Ali al-Dabbagh didn’t say where he wanted the troops to withdraw to.

    I wonder if he still wants US troops to stay in the ever dangerous Iraqi-Pakastani border regions.

  • “That’s what happens when you win wars.” – McCain, 7/21/08

    Really? That’s going to be his line now???

  • Let’s see. Obama wants the troops out in 16 months from whenever he gets the policy started.
    The Iraqis want the troops out in 2010 or the end of 2010, which is 11 to 23 months after Obama would have a say on when the troops leave.
    JSMcC*nt wants the troops out by 2013 or over his dead body, which ever comes first.

  • I’m vacationing in Minnesota, and the Robert Reid analysis from the Associated Press ran below the fold on the front page of today’s Mankato Free Press. (Small daily paper, 6-page news section, 20 pages total.)

    Headlined Iraq uses Obama to squeeze White House, it strikes me as a Bush-centric, Bush-friendly piece. Reid suggests Maliki is trying to assert independence from Bush by inserting himself into US politics, manipulating Obama’s presence for immediate gain, regardless of who takes office in January.

  • It’ll be interesting to see how this plays out this week on the TV news shows. I watched CNN occasionally, and could barely keep the vomit down watching the hosts and guests all agree that Obama basically was screwed by going to Iraq, because the surge was such a success that he’d now have to agree with McCain, or if he didn’t, he’d just look like a nutty liberal. Well, now we have the President of that country saying “yeah, he’s right, 16 months is a good idea”. So will those same gasbags talk about how this is great for Obama? Doubt it.

  • Welcome to Mayberry Mr. McCain. Here you see our mousekedoer. We use it to make our own reality.

  • “Reid suggests Maliki is trying to assert independence from Bush by inserting himself into US politics, manipulating Obama’s presence for immediate gain, regardless of who takes office in January.”

    This seems to me to be likely correct. If Maliki wants to get US troops out quickly, he is well advised to use this moment to force the issue. By doing so, he could force concessions from Bush/McCain that will leave him in a stronger negotiating position if Obama somehow loses. Otherwise, if McCain were to win he would have essentially no bargaining power.

    Of course, all of that misses the point, which is that this incident clearly demonstrates that the Iraqis have no stomach for a long term presence of American troops of the kind that McCain and Bush have been seeking.

  • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/uselection2008/2049446/Barack-Obama-beats-John-McCain-in-European-vote-US-election-2008.html

    How in the bag is the US media for McCain? 70% of Italians support Obama, 15% support McCain. In Germany, the numbers are 67%-6%. France: 65%-8%. England: 49%-14%. It takes a hell of a lot of bullshitting every day to keep McCain even remotely in this race. In a country with a free press he would be down by at least 30 points. Republican policies have failed this country and the whole world miserably over the last 8 years, no sane informed person would vote to let them continue failing for 4 more years.

  • Shalimar, @13,

    That one’s easy to spin for the home consumption: all them cutters and runners support a cutter and runner for US president. As expected.

  • Probably hopelessly out of touch, BUT: What’s happened to the WaPo for it to get to where it is now from where it used to be circa Watergate? As someone at a major NY daily once said about that paper, A fish rots from the head — inelegant, perhaps, and possibly arguable (on every other fifth Monday of February) but an invaluable concept. So, the question is who and what has driven this rather astonishing departure from basic newspaper/press standards, values, mission? Thanks.

  • “By the end of 2010” to me means sometime between today and 31 December 2010. So if Obama is talking about somewhere around May 2010, seems like it fits nicely. Now with McCain, he said sometime in 2108 is OK with him. If I were Maliki, I wonder who I’d support…

  • I was hoping to see Senator Obama actually deliver on his campaign promises. Sadly, however, it appears that Obama is as dangerous and disappointing as any other political candidate. All his talk about world peace, better trans-Atlantic relations and negotiating with Iran- beautiful- not to mention finally passing the long-overdue milestone of electing our first minority president- priceless- …
    But moving the war on terror to Pakistan could have disastrous consequences on both the political stability in the region, and in the broader balance of power. Scholars such as Richard Betts accurately point out that beyond Iran or North Korea, “Pakistan may harbor the greatest potential danger of all.” With the current instability in Pakistan, Betts points to the danger that a pro-Taliban government would pose in a nuclear Pakistan. This is no minor point to be made. While the Shi’a in Iran are highly unlikely to proliferate WMD to their Sunni enemies, the Pakistanis harbor no such enmity toward Sunni terrorist organizations. Should a pro-Taliban or other similar type of government come to power in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda’s chances of gaining access to nuclear weapons would dramatically increase overnight.

    There are, of course, two sides to every argument; and this argument is no exception. On the one hand, some insist that American forces are needed in order to maintain political stability and to prevent such a government from rising to power. On the other hand, there are those who believe that a deliberate attack against Pakistan’s state sovereignty will only further enrage its radical population, and serve to radicalize its moderates. I offer the following in support of this latter argument:

    Pakistan has approximately 160 million people; better than half of the population of the entire Arab world. Pakistan also has some of the deepest underlying ethnic fissures in the region, which could lead to long-term disintegration of the state if exacerbated. Even with an impressive growth in GDP (second only to China in all of Asia), it could be decades before wide-spread poverty is alleviated and a stable middle class is established in Pakistan.

    Furthermore, the absence of a deeply embedded democratic system in Pakistan presents perhaps the greatest danger to stability. In this country, upon which the facade of democracy has been thrust by outside forces and the current regime came to power by coup, the army fulfills the role of “referee within the political boxing ring.” However, this referee demonstrates a “strong personal interest in the outcome of many of the fights and a strong tendency to make up the rules as he goes along.” The Pakistani army “also has a long record of either joining in the fight on one side or the other, or clubbing both boxers to the ground and taking the prize himself” (Lieven, 2006:43).

    Pakistan’s army is also unusually large. Thathiah Ravi (2006:119, 121) observes that the army has “outgrown its watchdog role to become the master of this nation state.” Ravi attributes America’s less than dependable alliance with Pakistan to the nature of its army. “Occasionally, it perceives the Pakistan Army as an inescapable ally and at other times as a threat to regional peace and [a] non-proliferation regime.” According to Ravi, India and Afghanistan blame the conflict in Kashmir and the Durand line on the Pakistan Army, accusing it of “inciting, abetting and encouraging terrorism from its soil.” Ravi also blames the “flagrant violations in nuclear proliferation by Pakistan, both as an originator and as a conduit for China and North Korea” on the Pakistan Army, because of its support for terrorists.

    The point to be made is that the stability of Pakistan depends upon maintaining the delicate balance of power both within the state of Pakistan, and in the broader region. Pakistan is not an island, it has alliances and enemies. Moving American troops into Pakistan will no doubt not only serve to radicalize its population and fuel the popular call for Jihad, it could also spark a proxy war with China that could have long-lasting economic repercussions. Focusing on the more immediate impact American troops would have on the Pakistani population; let’s consider a few past encounters:

    On January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area. In a nuclear state like Pakistan, this was not only unfortunate, it was outright stupid.

    On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the US, attacked a madrassah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced that the US military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam.

    On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, adding that terrorism will be eliminated “with an iron hand.” The point to be driven home is that the attack on the madrassah was kept as quiet as possible, while the suicide bombing was publicized as a tragedy, and one more reason to maintain the war on terror.

    Last year trouble escalated when the Pakistani government laid siege to the Red Mosque and more than 100 people were killed. “Even before his soldiers had overrun the Lal Masjid … the retaliations began.” Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center. Guerrilla attacks that demonstrated a shocking degree of organization and speed-not to mention strategic cunning revealed that they were orchestrated by none other than al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri; a fact confirmed by Pakistani and Taliban officials. One such attack occurred on July 15, 2007, when a suicide bomber killed 24 Pakistani troops and injured some 30 others in the village of Daznaray (20 miles to the north of Miran Shah, in North Waziristan). Musharraf ordered thousands of troops into the region to attempt to restore order. But radical groups swore to retaliate against the government for its siege of the mosque and its cooperation with the United States.

    A July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes that “al Qaeda is resurgent in Pakistan- and more centrally organized than it has been at any time since 9/11.” The NIE reports that al-Qaeda now enjoys sanctuary in Bajaur and North Waziristan, from which they operate “a complex command, control, training and recruitment base” with an “intact hierarchy of top leadership and operational lieutenants.”

    In September 2006 Musharraf signed a peace deal with Pashtun tribal elders in North Waziristan. The deal gave pro-Taliban militants full control of security in the area. Al Qaeda provides funding, training and ideological inspiration, while Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Tribal leaders supply the manpower. These forces are so strong that last year Musharraf sent well over 100,000 trained Pakistani soldiers against them, but they were not able to prevail against them.

    The question remains, what does America do when Pakistan no longer has a Musharraf to bridge the gap? While Musharraf claims that President Bush has assured him of Pakistan’s sovereignty, Senator Obama obviously has no intention of honoring such an assurance. As it is, the Pakistanis do just enough to avoid jeopardizing U.S. support. Musharraf, who is caught between Pakistan’s dependence on American aid and loyalty to the Pakistani people, denies being George Bush’s hand-puppet. Musharraf insists that he is “200 percent certain” that the United States will not unilaterally decide to attack terrorists on Pakistani soil. What happens when we begin to do just that?

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