Guest Post by Tom Schaller
I’m writing a book in which I argue that Democrats need to end, not begin, their path back to a national majority in the South. The metaphor I use is that of filling a fruit basket: The Northeast and Pacific Coast states are the windfallen fruit at our feet which can most quickly and easily be picked up and put in the basket; the Midwest, long the most competitive region in the country, is the low-hanging fruit; the Southwest and parts of the Interior West are the fruit mid-tree that require a step stool or some climbing; finally, at the top is the South (and the Deep South in particular), which require the unstable, risky practice of leaning a tall ladder against the narrowest portion of the tree trunk.
OK, so maybe it’s a bit too clever on the metaphor part, but you get the gist. Anyway, I bring this up because one of the first questions people ask me in regard to my thesis is, “what about Dean’s 50-state strategy? You must disagree with that and agree with Rahm Emanuel, right?”
Wrong…I actually think both Dean and Emanuel can be right—that it is not a mutually-exclusive choice. To explain:
As I understand it, Dean’s 50-state strategy calls for a minimum floor in each state which will essentially prevent the Democrats from (a) ever being caught totally unprepared and unarmed if, suddenly, a death or scandal or retirement provides a great opportunity; (b) having to reinvent the wheel every two years by having a semi-permanent staff—or at least a rotating permanent staff, with institutional memory and data and contacts and experience passed along—so that the party does not have to suffer the inefficiencies of starting anew each cycle.
This makes perfect sense. Dean is calling for a mininum floor, not an overhead ceiling. If, on the other hand, he were calling for an equal distribution of DNC resources—or worse, a proportional, population-based distribution of resources—I’d be the first respond by calling for him to get a CAT-scan.
Meanwhile, Emanuel is right, too: A party concentrates its resources based on its best risk-reward assessment of the present state of play. Will that mean sometimes dumping money into what turns out to be a lost cause (think Babbit’s run against Renzi in 2004) or, conversely, missing what could have been a great opportunity (think Gore in Ohio in 2000)? Of course. But if Ike had decided to distribute our troops evenly across every inch of the French coast, rather than concentrating on Normandy, we might all be speaking German right now. You target as best you can, work hard, and hope most of the breaks go your way. That’s applying the basics of game theory to modern politics, and we need more of that kind of thinking.
In short, and at the risk of oversimplifying the matter, Dean is playing defense (we’d want all of our coastline protected, right?) while Emanuel is playing offense (finding and targeting the weakest points for attack). I’m not trying to equivocate or be ambivalent. I really think the Dean-Emanuel dichotomy is a false one.