The AP noted yesterday that November, which is barely half over, is already the second deadliest month for American troops in Iraq since we launched an invasion in March 2003.
The worst month was last April, with 135 deaths, when the insurgency intensified and U.S. Marines fought fierce battles in Fallujah, only to be withdrawn from the city. That was part of a failed attempt to put the now-defunct Fallujah Brigade of U.S. and allied Iraqi forces in charge.
Until now the second-deadliest month was November 2003 with 82 deaths, and 80 Americans died in May and September this year.
The rising death toll coincides with U.S. military commanders’ efforts to pacify areas of Iraq that need to be brought under Iraqi government control before elections scheduled for late January. It also reflects an escalation of attacks by the insurgents, although some U.S. commanders say they believe this may be a last-gasp effort by rebel forces outmatched by U.S. firepower.
With this in mind, I’d like to point out that the high casualty rate is coming after the presidential election — by design. Let’s not forget what the LA Times reported in October:
The Bush administration plans to delay major assaults on rebel-held cities in Iraq until after U.S. elections in November, say administration officials, mindful that large-scale military offensives could affect the U.S. presidential race.
Although American commanders in Iraq have been buoyed by recent successes in insurgent-held towns such as Samarra and Tall Afar, administration and Pentagon officials say they will not try to retake cities such as Fallouja and Ramadi — where the insurgents’ grip is strongest and U.S. military casualties could be the highest — until after Americans vote in what is likely to be an extremely close election.
“When this election’s over, you’ll see us move very vigorously,” said one senior administration official involved in strategic planning, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“Once you’re past the election, it changes the political ramifications” of a large-scale offensive, the official said. “We’re not on hold right now. We’re just not as aggressive.”
Bush pulled back from fighting an aggressive war against insurgents because of politics, plain and simple. Now we’re seeing the consequences.
U.S. forces could have moved “vigorously” in September and October, but that would have led to higher casualties, which might have led to lower poll numbers, which might have led Bush to lose. Instead, Bush chose to fight a war based on a political campaign’s calendar.
This is not just another crass tactic from the Bush White House; it’s also a scheme that, as Matt Yglesias explained in September, put more American lives directly at risk.
First and foremost, of course, the president must keep the body count low if he wants to win [the election]. Iraqi deaths and shifts of public opinion are the stuff of the inside pages of our newspapers. Dead Americans make page 1 and the evening news. When enough die, it may even lead the news, or make the local news. It wouldn’t be prudent to let that happen. So Bush has adopted policies designed to keep the death count low, primarily by avoiding ground combat in the Sunni triangle. Good campaign tactics, needless to say, but, as ever, the Bush team seems better at winning elections than winning wars. By delaying any assault on the wily Salafi terrorists (read: Democratic campaign operatives) lurking in Fallujah, Samarra, Ramadi, and Baquba until after November, we give them more time to dig in, prepare defenses, and strengthen their forces before the attack.
An important point comes next, so it gets a paragraph of its own: This plan will get people killed. If an assault is to be mounted, it should be done as soon as possible, before the adversary has been given months to prepare for it. The Marines and soldiers serving in Iraq volunteered for the military, but they’ve been conscripted into the Bush campaign. Decisions, as Lieutenant General James Conway recently stated, are being made on the basis of narrow political considerations rather than military ones. It’s appropriate for generals to be subordinate to civilian politicians, but not to civilian campaign strategists. We’re waging war as an extension of an electoral campaign, exposing our soldiers to harassing attacks right now and to a more difficult fight later on in order to help secure the president’s re-election.
Everything has gone as expected. Bush’s political campaign excelled, the insurgents gained a stronger hold and waited for the delayed U.S. offensive, and American troops are paying for the delay with their lives.
We’ll get the bad guys, Bush says, but only at a time that’s convenient for his political interests. Politics always comes first with this gang, no matter the costs.