When “No End in Sight,” a gripping, fascinating documentary, first hit theaters a few weeks ago, it quickly got caught up on the debate surrounding the “incompetence dodge.” The film does a fantastic job of highlighting the breathtaking mistakes the Bush administration made during the first few years of the war in Iraq, which some interpreted as an argument that the war would have been far more successful if the White House hadn’t kept making the wrong decisions, over and over again.
For those who dismiss the “incompetence dodge,” the argument is fundamentally flawed — Bush’s jaw-dropping mistakes didn’t help, but Iraq was going to deteriorate even if the White House wasn’t such an embarrassment. (For the record, I thought “No End in Sight” took a relatively agnostic position on the question.)
I’m generally persuaded by those who make the “incompetence dodge” argument, but that doesn’t mean we should brush too quickly past all of the many spectacularly wrong decisions the administration made. Today, for example, Roger Cohen writes in the NYT about a 2003 plan whereby Bush would name two Iraqi envoys: L. Paul Bremmer and Zalmay Khalilzad. Bremmer would run the CPA, while Khalilzad, a Farsi-speaking Sunni Muslim, would convene a grand assembly that would fast-forward a provisional Iraqi government.
Except, one day, the White House explicably changed its mind.
Instead, the appointment of L. Paul Bremer III to head a Coalition Provisional Authority was announced. Khalilzad, incredulous, went elsewhere. In the place of an Afghan-American Muslim on a mission to empower Iraqis, we got the former ambassador to the Netherlands for a one-year proconsul gig.
“We had cleared both announcements, with Bremer to run things and me to convene the loya jirga, both as presidential envoys,” Khalilzad told me. “We were just playing with a few final words. Then the game plan suddenly changed: we would run the country ourselves.”
Alluding to former Secretary of State Colin Powell and his successor, Condoleezza Rice, who was then national security adviser, Khalilzad continued: “Powell and Condi were incredulous. Powell called me and asked: ‘What happened?’ And I said, ‘You’re secretary of state and you’re asking me what happened!’ ”
Powell confirmed his astonishment. “The plan was for Zal to go back,” he said. “He was the one guy who knew this place better than anyone. I thought this was part of the deal with Bremer. But with no discussion, no debate, things changed. I was stunned.”
What happened? Apparently, Bremer and Bush had lunch.
The two had a chat, without input from Powell or Rice, and Bremer told the president, “You can’t have two presidential envoys running around Iraq.” And that was that. The Decider scrapped the plan and Bremer proceeded to screw up royally.
Khalilzad, currently Bush’s Ambassador to the U.N., still ponders what could have been.
“I feel strongly that the U.S. ruling was wrong. We could have had an interim Iraqi government. I argued, based on Afghanistan, that with forces, diplomacy and money, nothing can happen anyway without your support.”
Powell agrees. “Everything was Bremer, the suit, the boots, the whole nine yards.” It was a mistake not to move “more rapidly to putting an Iraqi face on it.”
Khalilzad and Powell are right. The insurgency that took hold after Bremer’s arrival had a clear target: the guy in Timberlands. Given the extent of its post-cold-war power, the United States must wield it with subtlety. This was the sledgehammer approach.
And chosen over lunch. “Unfortunately, yes, the way that decision was taken was typical,” Powell said. “Done! No full deliberations. And you suddenly discover, gee, maybe that wasn’t so great, we should have thought about it a little longer.”
Bush? Think? You’re such a kidder, Mr. Powell.
At every juncture, Bush was given a choice. In each instance, he choose poorly and made Iraq worse. Every. Single. Time. It’s almost as if he were intentionally trying to undermine U.S. policy.
As for Khalilzad, I’m delighted to see that he’s willing to speak out now, though given the White House history, he should probably start updating his resume — dishing dirt to the NYT is generally grounds for dismissal, especially when the dirt is true.