A few weeks ago, I was offering a critique of a Washington Post article, written by Univ of Maryland prof Thomas Schaller, on whether the Dems should just give up on the South altogether and concentrate its attention and resources elsewhere. At the time, I said it would be a mistake for the party to follow this course. I’ve since come to realize, however, that part of my reasoning was not only false, but backwards.
I argued, mistakenly, that once the Dems decided to abandon the South and cede the region to the GOP, Bush and the Republicans would be free to use its overwhelming financial advantage to target the competitive battleground states. Once Karl Rove & Co. realized they wouldn’t have to worry about spending any of their resources south of the Mason-Dixon line, I argued that all of the money that would have been spent in the South would immediately be re-directed to states like Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and other key states that Bush narrowly lost in 2000.
In other words, in order to “keep Bush honest,” Dems would have to invest in states in the South that we weren’t likely to win, in the hopes that doing so would improve our chances in other states that we had to win.
Since I made this argument, I’ve had the chance to correspond a bit with Prof. Schaller about the merits of this strategy. The more I think about it, the more I realize that he has a very good point. As Schaller explained:
Let’s start with a basic axiom: Any identical amount subtracted from a ratio widens that ratio: 8/9 6/7 5/6 2/3. Now, we all know Bush will have more money than the Dems — a point you make in defense of your criticism, in fact. And, though the projections may vary, let’s say the totals are$240M to $160M, or a 3:2 ratio. (It matters not the actual numbers, so long as the GOP has more.)
So the Dems do as you suggest and dump, say, $40M to try to win some combination of FL, TN, AR, and LA — the only “target” states where they really have a shot — to avoid getting destroyed in the South. Critics like you generally refer to this as the “keeping Bush honest” strategy.
Now, Rove could play it safe and match that $40M and, I think it’s fair to assume, keep all four of those states in the…Bush column again in 2004 as they did four years ago. Indeed, given that political scientists have demonstrated that the “price” of GOP vote is less than a Dem vote in the South, and declining, Bush could spend much less and probably still hold those four states and surely the other eight southern states where the Dems have already folded. But let’s assume Rove gets “suckered” into matching dollar-for-dollar because we’ve so frightened him about holding his sacred South, as you would have it.
What’s left to spend in the 38 non-southern states? The equal ratio rule shows who the sucker really is: The Democratic nominee, because Bush now has$200M left to $120M for the Dems, or a wider, 5:3 resource advantage for Bush to pummel the Dems even further in the other states. And the more the Dems spend in the South, the wider that ratio becomes. The South is an electoral money pit for the Dems.
The more I thought about Schaller’s central criticism of the “keeping Bush honest” strategy, the more I began to realize that his broader point is absolutely true — it doesn’t make any sense for a presidential candidate or a political party to spend money in states (or regions) they are all-but-certain to lose. It won’t make our opponent weaker; it only makes it harder for us to compete with limited resources.
Indeed, if there’s one lesson I learned growing up it’s this: Fish where the fishing is good. A Democratic presidential candidate would be unwise to spend limited time and resources next year in, say, Alabama, in the foolish hope that somehow we could convince Bush to throw a few bucks at the state, instead of in Pennsylvania. No matter who we nominate, every penny we spent would be in vain — Bush is going to win Alabama’s 9 electoral votes no matter what.
In fact, this simply follows a practical common sense that campaigns use all the time. Will Bush/Cheney ’04 be investing a lot of resources next year in Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia, in the hopes of “keeping the Dems honest”? Of course not. Both sides will invest time and money in competitive states, rather than the ones they are certain to win or certain to lose.
That said, I’m abandoning my “keeping Bush honest” tack, but I remain hesitant to endorse the idea of the Dems abandoning the South. (I know, I’m stubborn)
First, I think it’s a mistake to treat all the states in the region as relative equals in their potential relevance to a successful Democratic presidential campaign. There’s a significant difference between states like Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina, which are GOP locks, and Arkansas, Louisiana, Florida, and Tennessee, which I believe can be competitive.
Second, I’m concerned about the down-ballot consequences of giving up on the South. If the Dem national party and presidential candidate conceded the entire region and redirected its already scarce resources elsewhere, what becomes of the Southern Dem candidates who rely, in part, on resources from the national level to remain competitive?
When the national party and its presidential candidate decide to compete in a state, that state is infused with professional political staff and resources for advertising, grassroots organizing, GOTV efforts, institutional infrastructure, and the like. Whether these resources translate into success in the given state for the presidential candidate is important, but it’s also worth noting that these same resources improve the chances for Dems down-ballot as well.
And lastly, I’m troubled by the long-term implications of giving up on the South. While I agree that campaigns should be forward-thinking, and it’s folly to try and re-fight the elections of the past, I find it difficult to believe that no Southern states should be considered part of a national coalition for the indefinite future.
Indeed, as the estimable Ruy Teixeira recently said, it’s wrong to write off Southern voters “because many southern voters are, in fact, reachable by Democrats and becoming more so over time.” He adds that “Democrats need to cultivate these voters, not abandon them. Otherwise, Democrats will throw away the longer term opportunities created by demographic and economic change in the south.”
So, in short, I’m willing to concede that the “keeping Bush honest” tactic is terribly flawed, but I continue to believe that at least some of the South deserves Dem attention in ’04 and beyond.