Radar magazine’s Jebediah Reed noted this week that the New York Times’ David Brooks had a fascinating item not too long ago about the inherent benefits of a meritocracy. It is “a way of life that emphasizes … perpetual improvement, and permanent exertion,” he effused. Brooks went on to describe a meritocracy as being essential to America’s dynamism and character.
And yet, the punditocracy, of which Brooks is a major part, seems to have turned the idea of a meritocracy on its head, particularly when it comes to the war in Iraq. Jebediah Reed explained in a fascinating piece that, in far too many instances, pundits who got the war wrong have been richly rewarded, while those who those who were right have seen their careers suffer. In retrospect, it makes Brooks’ talk of a meritocracy look almost silly.
Noticing our nation is stuck in an unwinnable war (or two), we wondered if America hasn’t stumbled off the meritocratic path. More specifically, since political pundits like Brooks play such a central role in our national decision-making process, maybe something is amiss in the world of punditry. Are the incentives well-aligned? Surely those who warned us not to invade Iraq have been recognized and rewarded, and those who pushed for this disaster face tattered credibility and waning career prospects. Could it be any other way in America?
So we selected the four pundits who were in our judgment the most influentially and disturbingly misguided in their pro-war arguments and the four who were most prescient and forceful in their opposition.
The results of the research weren’t encouraging. Thomas Friedman got the war in Iraq wrong, and has parlayed his mistakes into significantly improving his career. Peter Beinart has seen his career standing improve dramatically since getting the war wrong, as has Jeffrey Goldberg and Fareed Zakaria. In contrast, Robert Scheer, William S. Lind, Jonathan Schell, and Scott Ritter were all right before the invasion, and have seen their pundit careers suffer.
How is it, exactly, that those in the punditocracy who make the most mistakes about the most important world events manage to fall up?
Glenn Greenwald wrote a piece recently for the American Conservative — yes, that Glenn Greenwald and that American Conservative — touching on the same issue. As he explained, one reason pundits are free from scrutiny is that several just pretend that they were right all along.
When political leaders make drastic mistakes, accountability is delivered in the form of elections. That occurred in November when voters removed the party principally responsible for the war in Iraq. But the invasion would not have occurred had Americans not been persuaded of its wisdom and necessity, and leading that charge was a stable of pundits and media analysts who glorified President Bush’s policies and disseminated all sorts of false information and baseless assurances.
Yet there seems to be no accountability for these pro-war pundits. On the contrary, they continue to pose as wise, responsible experts and have suffered no lost credibility, prominence, or influence. They have accomplished this feat largely by evading responsibility for their prior opinions, pretending that they were right all along or, in the most extreme cases, denying that they ever supported the war.
Are we at a point in which it just doesn’t matter if pundits are right? Where’s the meritocracy? And why is there no accountability for those who help shape the political discourse?
Discuss.