The counterrevolution will not be televised. It will also not feature 50 Cent

Guest Post by Morbo

I used to think Iran’s Islamic fundamentalist theocracy would collapse under the weight of America’s oppressive, offensive and all-consuming popular culture.

The majority of the Iranian population is young, and many of them are chaffing at the repressive rules of the mullahs. But a recent article in The New Yorker has led me to believe that many in the media may have been too optimistic in thinking that hip-hop and fashions inspired by “The O.C.” would spark a counterrevolution.

As Laura Secor points out in the piece, many Iranian young people have become frustrated at their lack of progress – and the situation in the country seems to be going backwards in the wake of recent elections. Many young voters boycotted those elections, which saw a hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, assume the presidency.

For the past eight years, Iran under former president Mohammad Khatami loosened up a bit. Social codes were relaxed somewhat. Many young women, for example, took to wearing loose head scarves instead of full chadors. Dozens of newspaper sprang up, and some dared to criticize the government.

But Secor says it was all an illusion. Iran has always been run by a Supreme Religious Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the power to overrule elected officials. Secor notes that Khatami pursued some reforms and secured the passage of many laws, but a 12-member body controlled by Khamenei vetoed many of them.

A broader crackdown followed. Writes Secor:

Meanwhile, from 1999 through 2004, the clerical establishment closed more than a hundred newspapers and magazines, and hundreds of student activists and journalists were imprisoned, often under terrible conditions.

The fundamentalists who control Iran recognize the need to closely monitor potential trouble spots. Universities tend to be centers for dissent and demonstrations in most countries, thus in Iran all universities house units called Basij, which Secor describes as “a hard-line militia of young fundamentalists who provided physical enforcement for the conservatives.”

This reminds me of the hordes of Heritage Foundation interns and College Republicans who attack progressives in this country. They are just as effective in creating a climate of intimidation in Iran. Secor interviewed one of these young fanatics, Ali Belashabadi, who complained because some young women in the schools dress too provocatively “in a way that is meant to attract attention.”

Belashabadi said, “This is an academic atmosphere, and the men can’t pay attention. Even non-Muslims, if they were here, would be attracted to this type of fashion.” Belashabadi stated that Islamic women cannot wear makeup, perfume or revealing fashions in public. “These are our fundamental values,” he said. “We had a revolution for these values.”

So, the Iranians fought a revolution because women were wearing mini-skirts? I know there was more to it. The country, for example, had been straddled with a U.S. puppet, the shah, whose secret police terrorized the population.

But for a young generation of fundamentalists, who were born after the revolution and for whom to shah is a figure from a history book, the revolution really does seem to have been about women wearing mini-skirts and resistance to what are seen as decadent Western values.

The young fundamentalists are close to the centers of power, and will probably ascend to those positions as they get older. This leaves the Iranians who long for change out in the cold.

One young man interviewed by Secor, identified by the first name of Arash, speaks of his fondness for America — a country he has never visited. He has embraced a hip-hop culture through the form of contraband CDs. It makes for an interesting form of cultural subversion in such a closed society, but it’s only going to take Arfash so far. In the recent election, Arash, like many of his friends, was so disgusted he did not vote.

Iran will change some day. But that change is probably going to take a lot longer than anyone in the West realizes. Hard-line fundamentalists have a way of digging in and creating power structures that become self perpetuating. It will take more than a few rap artists and underground DVDs to dislodge them.

There is no question that Iran, its culture, its politics, its factions are a very complicated puzzle that will not be solved easily.

That said, lets not underestimate how badly the US — and specifically Dumbya’s administration — have screwed things up the past several years. This would be sad enough were it merely a diplomatic gaffe that hinders our relations with Iran. The real victims, however, are the young and middle-aged non-hardliners who want better economic opportunities, less stifling social controls, and to live without constant fear of KGB-like theocratic thug brigades spying on, beating, or arresting them.

Khatami had been pushing for reform as hard as one could in his position which, unfortunately but realistically, is not very hard. That he got any reforms to stick was a tribute to his skills. He had amassed significant public following and was making measured sounds of openness to the west. This was at great personal sacrifice: his own brother was arrested and jailed by the readical islamists.

Rather than work quietly on ways to empower and embolden Khatami, or work loudly against the theocrats looming over him, the bumbling Bushies, with their “with us or against us” lack of grace, came into office ripping on Iran and essentially marginalizing Khatami. When reminded by reporters or others that the president of this alleged evil empire was relatively moderate, they emasculated him by telling the world “he doesn’t matter, he has no power, Iran is no more than the theocrats behind the throne.”

For a young Iranian progressive, why go vote for Khatami? In exchange for the risk of being an enemy of the locall SS, you’ve just been told by the superpower to give up, you have no chance, notwithstanding popular support. You’ve just been told the west wont be there to help against the theocratic thugs. You’ve just been told no one has noticed all of the changes your efforts in the street and the ballot box have started.

I surely don’t have all the answers, and there is no assurance that any strategy would have succeeded. But I do know a certain loser of a strategy when I see one. Can anyone really think Dumbya handled Khatami’s tenure well? It sure seems like a huge lost opportunity to me.

  • On my recent (and first) trip to Africa, it slowly dawned on me that while the locals were giddily grabbing up western cultural items, such as music and language and TV soap operas, they were not really becoming “westernized” as a result. Instead, they were integrating these items into their own culture, and the result was sometimes like a Star Trek mirror world. You have to be careful how you interpret familiar items in this world.

    Look at how they managed to contort The Simpsons for the Muslim/Arab market. Homer may look like he’s in a bar, but he drinks soda, not beer.

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