Last week, the Iraq Study Group telegraphed the central point that could make their advice largely irrelevant. According to a WaPo report, the ISG isn’t calling for a withdrawal of most U.S. forces by 2008, only that it’d be a nice goal — which could easily be scrapped and is “predicated on the assumption that circumstances on the ground would permit” a withdrawal.
It’s a disconcerting point that’s emphasized in the final report.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. (emphasis added)
At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams and in training, equipping, advising, force protection and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al-Qaida in Iraq.
That’s quite an asterisk. In other words, if everything goes exactly as we’d like, we might be able to begin a major withdrawal. Remind me, how many times over the last 3+ years have conditions in Iraq gone as we’d like?
As Matt Yglesias put it, “It’s worth saying that from the beginning the Bush administration has always had a plan to withdraw the bulk of US combat forces from Iraq in 12-18 months. It’s just that the “plan” has always gone something like ‘we’ll do this super-awesome stuff, then the situation will improve, and then most of the combat troops will leave.’ The problem, of course, keeps being that the situation ‘unexpectedly’ fails to improve. The policy’s failure therefore becomes the justification for continuing the very policy that’s failing.”
It’s almost as if we should probably expect “unexpected developments.”
Ivo Daalder was also unimpressed with the ISG’s escape clause.
So what are the unexpected developments that could mean we should still be there, with all our combat forces, fighting a war?
Not the presence of terrorist groups or training grounds (for which the commission wants to retain special operations forces). Not, surely, the collapse of the Iraqi government or an all-out civil war — neither of which can be termed “unexpected” in any meaningful way.
The only “unexpected development” I can come up with would be if the civil war turns into a regional war, in which the neighbors of Iraq become active and open participants in the war. Not sure what U.S. combat troops would do in such a case, but it might qualify as an “unexpected development.”
Food for thought.