The article is not explicit, but an underlying theme of the Washington Post’s profile on Dick Cheney is that his unprecedented power is only possible because Bush is anxious to get out of the way.
Waxing or waning, Cheney holds his purchase on an unrivaled portfolio across the executive branch. Bush works most naturally, close observers said, at the level of broad objectives, broadly declared. Cheney, they said, inhabits an operational world in which means are matched with ends and some of the most important choices are made. When particulars rise to presidential notice, Cheney often steers the preparation of options and sits with Bush, in side-by-side wing chairs, as he is briefed.
Before the president casts the only vote that counts, the final words of counsel nearly always come from Cheney.
“Side-by-side wing chairs”? I’m reminded of the embarrassing point in 2004 in which the President agreed to talk to the 9/11 Commission, but only if Cheney could sit with Bush, and help answer questions, during the discussion.
When Bush, an inexperienced governor in a state where the governor has limited power, was running for the White House in 2000, his supporters insisted the nation need not worry — Bush had assembled a team of capable “advisors” who would help guide his hand.
What the equation didn’t consider is what happens when the advisors disagree and the President has to make a decision. As the Post’s profile makes clear, Bush has spent the better part of the last six years simply going along with Cheney’s demands. Dan Quayle characterized this as Cheney taking on the role of “surrogate chief of staff.” The reality is more disconcerting — Cheney has routinely been the “surrogate President,” with Bush putting his signature on the VP’s ideas because the VP told him it was the right thing to do.
When it came to creating military commissions, Cheney and his team crafted the policy, excluded administration officials, and limited Bush’s access to information and cabinet officials. What did Bush do? He signed the document Cheney put in front of him.
When it came to the NSA’s domestic warrantless-search program, the same thing happened. What did Bush do? He endorsed Cheney’s policy because, well, it was Cheney’s policy.
When it was time to brief the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees on the surveillance at the White House, lawmakers assumed “a conversation of that gravity would involve the commander in chief.” It didn’t. “We met in the vice president’s office,” recalled former Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), because Cheney had “the portfolio for intelligence activities.”
When it came to ignoring the Geneva Conventions, Cheney made his decision before Bush did.
On Nov. 14, 2001, the day after Bush signed the commissions order, Cheney took the next big step. He told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that terrorists do not “deserve to be treated as prisoners of war.”
The president had not yet made that decision. Ten weeks passed, and the Bush administration fought one of its fiercest internal brawls, before Bush ratified the policy that Cheney had declared: The Geneva Conventions would not apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters captured on the battlefield.
Meet George W. Bush, the not-so-innocent bystander of his own presidency.