Just last week, some conservatives resurrected the notion that the administration and Congress had access to the same Iraq-related intelligence before the invasion began. As if we needed yet another example to disapprove this embarrassing talking point, the New York Times ran a stunning item over the weekend about the administration using intelligence they knew to be unreliable.
A top member of Al Qaeda in American custody was identified as a likely fabricator months before the Bush administration began to use his statements as the foundation for its claims that Iraq trained Al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons, according to newly declassified portions of a Defense Intelligence Agency document.
The document, an intelligence report from February 2002, said it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, “was intentionally misleading the debriefers” in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda’s work with illicit weapons.
The document provides the earliest and strongest indication of doubts voiced by American intelligence agencies about Mr. Libi’s credibility. Without mentioning him by name, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, and other administration officials repeatedly cited Mr. Libi’s information as “credible” evidence that Iraq was training Al Qaeda members in the use of explosives and illicit weapons.
Libi was a remarkably productive witness for the administration, telling the Bush gang everything they wanted to hear. Iraq trained al Queda in using WMD, he said, which not only reinforced the administration’s arguments about chemical and biological weapons, but also connected Hussein’s regime and al Queda. Of course, none of it was even remotely true. Why would Libi lie? Because he was being tortured — and apparently would say anything to make the abuse stop.
Naturally, the administration saw intelligence reports explaining that the information was almost certainly wrong, but that didn’t stop the Bush gang from using the “intelligence” anyway, over and over again.
Editor & Publisher asked whether this is the “smoking gun on manipulation of Iraq intelligence?” It is, but as I recall, we’ve had similar smoking guns before. How many more do we really need?