Troop escalation ‘more of a political decision than a military one’

January 3, 2007

NBC Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski reported yesterday on the president’s escalation plan for Iraq (aka, the “McCain doctrine”), which Bush has reportedly “all but decided” to pursue.

The interesting part, as ThinkProgress noted, is the motivation driving the administration’s decision making. From last night’s broadcast:

“Administration officials told us today that President Bush has now all but decided to surge those additional troops into Baghdad to try to control over the violence there and only then could they accelerate the turnover of territory to Iraqi security forces. Fact is they’re not up to the task yet. The plan would also throw more U.S. money at Iraq for reconstruction and a jobs program.

“Interestingly enough, one administration official admitted to us today that this surge option is more of a political decision than a military one because the American people have run out of patience and President Bush is running out of time to achieve some kind of success in Iraq. While this plan will clearly draw some stiff opposition on Capitol Hill, the president is expected to announce it a week from today.” (emphasis added)

The Bush White House? Letting politics drive war policy? You don’t say.

Actually, this is very much in line with everything we’ve been hearing for several weeks. When the WaPo reported recently that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their opposition to the McCain doctrine, the article noted that the top uniformed leaders in the military believe the president “is latching on to the surge idea in part because of limited alternatives.” In other words, he wants to send more troops because he can’t think of anything else to do.

Referring back to Miklaszewski’s report, if escalation is a desperation move because of the public’s “impatience,” how does the president think the nation will respond when this fails, too?

Ever see a serious drunk who didn’t have to end up passed out in the gutter with the world passing him by and staring in pity before he could finally crawl to the meeting????

The only trouble is, in the eyes of the world, it’s going to be all of us down there soaked in pee and smelling of barf.

At least the Praetorian Guard had the presence of mind to kill Caligula when he demanded the impossible of them.

  • here’s the thing: first they’ve got to get the troops over there. then we’ve got to give the escalation “time” to show “results.” then they’ll trumpet some ambiguous statistic that means nothing but sounds good (attacks down 20%!). and by then it will be late 2007 and it would be “playing politics” to change anything, and as bush has always said, it will be the “next president’s” headache.

  • “Referring back to Miklaszewski’s report, if escalation is a desperation move because of the public’s “impatience,” how does the president think the nation will respond when this fails, too?”

    He’ll have to put the most impatient Americans in detention centers, where they will learn to respect the president’s deciderin’.

  • And the pity is, there is perhaps a legitimate surging solution. By many accounts, when Cheney was called into Saudi Arabia late last year, the Saudis told him that, should the U.S. pull out of Iraq, they would go in, on the side of the Sunnis. Well, how about calling them on that deal? How about we openly invite Saudi and other Sunni governments (Jordan…) to contribute troops to the Al-Anbar province (the Sunni Triangle) as peacekeepers? In return, we would withdraw to Baghdad. That would leave Sunnis in charge of the Sunni region, Kurds in charge of the Kurdish region, Shiites in Charge of the Shiite region in the south, and the U.S. would run the greater Baghdad area, where the groups of Sunnis and Shiites are much more co-mingled.

    Then, we could surge. Having 150-160,000 troops concentrated in the greater Baghdad area would be enough to keep the peace- clearing and staying, rather than clearing and moving on.

    This sort of solution would allow us to save face (an all-out withdrawal would not do us much of a favor, since the next enemy would face us in the same way), save lives, and maybe actually make some headway.

  • Playing politics with our troops? Bush? I’m shocked! Shocked, I say. But of course, it would be a terrible thing for those troop hating Democrats to play politics in Congress.

  • “…one administration official admitted to us today that this surge option is more of a political decision than a military one…”

    Meaning exactly what. That this is a trick to undermine the Democrats? That this is a trick to undermine John McCan’t (which I am quite willing to believe)? That this is just a trick to stall pulling out and admiting that Boy George II’s defective brain policy has lead us to an unavoidable defeat?

    Take your choice.

  • I remember Shrub answering a question once about the conduct of the Vietnam War.

    At that time Shrub said he supported the war but his main criticism was that it was a political war with decisions made by politicians not generals (or something to the effect).

    I guess Iraq is different somehow. Sure Snow could tell us why.

  • the Shrub quote about Vietnam and politicians can be found here via MTP and Russert: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/

    Russert: Were you favor of the war in Vietnam?

    President Bush: I supported my government. I did. And would have gone had my unit been called up, by the way.

    Russert: But you didn’t volunteer or enlist to go.

    President Bush: No, I didn’t. You’re right. I served. I flew fighters and enjoyed it, and provided a service to our country. In those days we had what was called “air defense command,” and it was a part of the air defense command system.

    The thing about the Vietnam War that troubles me as I look back was it was a political war. We had politicians making military decisions, and it is lessons that any president must learn, and that is to the set the goal and the objective and allow the military to come up with the plans to achieve that objective. And those are essential lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War.

  • good job brian.

    Of course Bush set an impossible goal based on lies, so even if he didn’t meddle it would be FUBAR.

  • I think you have a well-reasoned response, Castor Troy (#4). Probably the only plan which could, in the end, actually work. Trouble is that you’re using old-fashioned, reality-based thinking whereas the Bush Crime Family believes that it alone (with God’s help, of course) can create reality de novo.

  • I don’t have an issue with raising, maintaining or reducing the number of troops as part of a plan to address Iraq.

    I, however, have a major issue with the judgment of the person making the decision and how well such a plan will be implemented.

    Gross incompetence, anyone?

  • “At that time Shrub said he supported the war but his main criticism was that it was a political war with decisions made by politicians not generals required him to take time out of his busy coke snorting schedule to show up for NG training. When he could be bothered.”

    But yes, as howard says, by the time the soldiers (surgers?) are trained and ready to go, we’ll be well into 07. (And I’m still not sure where the equipment is coming from. Maybe they’ll nail some of those metal apartment doors to some commandered Hummers?)

    From there ShrubCo just needs to stall and talk about patience and allowing the troops to do their job (get blowed up) until late next year. This still leaves a few problems for the BushBrat:

    1. He can’t call a time out. The Iraqis fighting one another and the occupiers aren’t going to sit down wait patiently until more soldiers show up. Word there is going to be a surge might make people say “Fine, let’s clear out as many as this lot as we can.”

    2. As several people have pointed out, other coalition forces are pulling out, which might mean there will be FEWER total soldiers in Iraq by the time the fresh ones show up. Oops.

    3. Once the military starts to implement his final, perfect, honest this one will really work, plan, anything that happens will be even more closely tied to his arse. He ignored the ISG, JCS, everything except the voices in his head. I think he’s sentient enough to realize this so perhaps he’s almost afraid to reveal his plan. He has been stalling quite a bit.

  • Castor Troy @ #4,

    That’s actually a pretty solid suggestion. Do you suppose the concern with an approach like that would, among other things, potentially give rise to more violence between the sunni and shite areas? Admittedly, I don’t know as much as I should about the region, but it seems to me that the potential for a sunni/shite proxy war in central/south central Iraq between Iran and Jordon/Saudi Arabia would be great if the latter group openly controlled the sunni triangle.

    Again, though, its one of the few potentially good suggestions I’ve read in a long time. any other commenters care to opine on this?

  • Ed- yeah, unfortunately I work on the hospital side, where we patch up the results from the mistakes, rather than the policy side, where they create them.

    But, ultimately, something like that will have to take place. We can’t possibly control the entire country with our limited troops, and if we withdraw, Iran and Saudi Arabia are going in anyway. Would be much better to invite them (ok, NOT Iran) in on our terms. As our troops have so many times shown, they can clear an area just fine. But we need a much higher concentration of troops to be able to hold. A withdrawal to the Baghdad area allows us to concentrate our troops, and shows the resolve needed to back off potential enemies (even being generally anti-war, I don’t see a positive result if we leave now. Leaving now just emboldens the next despot who wants to challenge us). Leaving the various groups in charge of ‘their’ areas also limits the sectarian violence.

  • Edo- Basically, Iraq is 4 solid parts. The Kurdish North, the Sunni Middle/West, the Shiite South, and the greater Baghdad area (although there are significant divisions within Baghdad- I am sure you have heard of ‘Sadr City’, a Shiite enclave within the sprawling region). And groups, outside of Baghdad proper, are generally stable, ethnicity-wise.

    When was the last time that you heard of significant violence in the Kurdish north? It’s been a while, because the region is mostly under local Kurdish control. The Shiite South is also mostly stable, because we have Shiite populations being run by Shiite governments.

    The one constant thorn in our side is the Sunni Triangle- Al-Anbar and so. And here, we have a real problem. Why? Because we can’t create a Sunni group to run it. If we bring in Shiites, the slaughter commences- on both sides. The Shiite troops would kill the Sunnis for revenge, and the Sunni insurgents there would be doing the same in reverse.

    However, if we openly call the bluffs from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, then, if they are willing to commit, we can change the course in the area. If the troops on the ground in Al-Anbar are not American or Shiite, but rather Sunni, then there is much less room for ‘sectarian violence’ excuses. And, slap up a map, it is in both Saudi Arabia’s and Jordan’s interest to have Al-Anbar as a stable area.

    The thing we are trying to avoid, of course, is the splitting up of Iraq into these three factions (if the Kurds declare independence, Turkey and Iran would be on them in 5 seconds flat. Their own indigent Kurdish populations have been trouble spots for both countries). So, by concentrating our troops into a controllable area (the greater Baghdad area has a population of roughly 6 million), we can maintain ‘control’ of the entire country.

    The only trick to making it work is calling Saudi Arabia’s bluff. That’s why we have to make it public- ‘you told Cheney that, if we leave now, you are going in on behalf of the Sunnis. Well, we are inviting you in now, on behalf of the Sunnis, to control their region of Central Iraq’.

    It is, of course, a long shot, but, with the various ethnicities involved, it just might work.

  • “if escalation is a desperation move because of the public’s “impatience,” how does the president think the nation will respond when this fails, too? ”

    Remember, George, better to make a stand near either a flightline (Andrews AFB) or the ocean (Kennebunkport). Someplace where you can leave the country in a hurry.

    The White House is just too easy to surround with angry mobs.

    How is Paraguay this time of year?

  • So…once the “surge fodder” shows up at the airport in Baghdad, just how does the Decider propose to equip them? Of the equipment currently in-country (in Iraq), there’s enough broken and blown-up stuff to pave the streets of Manhattan. Or do the troops commit to a “communal” form of quartermastering—one rifle for every 2-to-3 combat soldiers, etc.? I can see the Sunday morning fundie-mercials now—“Donate to Guns For Jee-Zuz!” Or maybe we’ll see a fundraiser on FOX, with everyone skimming “their fair share” right off the top.

    This whole “surge” business just reeks to the upper atmosphere of “war profiteering….”

  • Great reply (again), Castor Troy (#15). Also 2Manchu (#16); Bush answers “El paraguayo estan muchi bonnita esto tempo di anyo, compadre.”

  • “El paraguayo estan muchi bonnita esto tempo di anyo, compadre.”

    Translation: Pull my finger buddy! Heh, heh, heh.

    Yes, I know. But the thought of Bush speaking any language besides his native Gibberish gives me a case of the sillies.

    El…um…pragwannuh isan…y’see…mucki – muki boneita yestuh tempuh du anus compaduklar.

    Sorry, still taking the cold meds.

  • Castor Troy,

    The one constant thorn in our side is the Sunni Triangle- Al-Anbar and so. And here, we have a real problem. Why? Because we can’t create a Sunni group to run it. If we bring in Shiites, the slaughter commences- on both sides. The Shiite troops would kill the Sunnis for revenge, and the Sunni insurgents there would be doing the same in reverse.

    Understood. What I’m wondering is what would stop the Sunnis, assuming they were materially and logistically supported by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, from extending their “borders” to the South and South East. ‘Cause that would result in an escalation of violence with Iran providing similar support, and possibly bodies. If that’s not the big concern, then what is the big concern with an approach like the one you suggest?

  • Somewhere in Anabar province, there’s probably some guy with an AK-47 and a smile, saying “Bring ’em on!”

  • Castor Troy’s idea is a good one, though there will be a few kinks in need of ironing out.

    The Saudi troops had better not bring their brand of Wahabbist ideology with them, otherwise we may have a new nursery ward of Osama bin Ladens, not that we haven’t given birth to a good number already.

    Getting the Shiite sector under control will take the cooperation of the Iranians not to further inflame, or arm, the sectarian conflicts. Plus, who will help keep the Shiite sectors from bubbling over with discontent, since Iran is the chief Shiite nation? I doubt Turkey or other ‘neutral” Muslim nations have the wherewithal do provide even a modicum of security or control.

    Germany and Berlin were partioned after WWII and while the nation has been glued back together, there are still wounds from the division.

    Pulling this off would require more diplomatic brains than the White House has (Condi? Hahahahahaha.) Additionally, this doesn’t look like anything that will pass as a “win” to the Repub base. And Bush’s ego is what this tragedy is all about.

    • Comments are closed.