In order for the United States to lessen its presence in Iraq, we’re told, Iraqi security forces have to grow in number, be trained, and be prepared to fight an insurgency. How’s that going? Remarkably badly.
The reformed Iraqi Ministry of Defense, a crucial element of any American plan to withdraw troops, is riddled with crippling problems that have raised concerns about its ability to keep Iraqi units paid, fed and equipped once it assumes full responsibility for the army, American and Iraqi commanders say.
The shortcomings of the ministry, which was overhauled under the American occupation authorities last year, are a growing concern to the American commanders. Hoping to withdraw large numbers of the 135,000 American combat troops in the next year, these commanders say their plans hinge on a functioning ministry. If American troops leave without one in place, they say, the Iraqi Army could quickly collapse.
“What are lacking are the systems that pay people, that supply people, that recruit people, that replace the wounded and AWOL, and systems that promote people and provide spare parts,” said a top American commander in Iraq, who asked not to be identified because his assessment of Iraqi abilities went beyond the military’s public descriptions.
“If they don’t have that capability, we won’t be able to take the training wheels off and let them operate independently,” the commander said.
Iraq’s Defense Ministry can’t pay, feed, equip, supply, recruit, or properly train Iraqi security forces. Other than that, though, it’s going well.
One Iraqi sergeant, who spent $100 of his own money on a new flak jacket, said, “The Ministry of Defense is useless.” This is the same ministry responsible for maintaining a Iraqi military.
This report comes just two weeks after we learned that only 3 of the 107 military and paramilitary Iraqi battalions are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
We’re going to be in Iraq for a long, long time.