The DNC’s “100 years” ad targeting John McCain drew the predictably ire of the Republican Party this week, with McCain allies arguing that McCain doesn’t want to keep the war going through 2108, he’s just willing to leave U.S. troops in Iraq there indefinitely to help maintain the peace.
Now, as I noted the other day, McCain has changed his mind on multiple of occasions about whether this is realistic, but for now, he seems to sincerely believe that Iraqis would not only allow the United States to maintain a Korea-like presence in Iraq for decades to come, but that such a presence is actually necessary.
This strikes me as a pretty ridiculous policy, but let’s take it a step further. McCain is willing to leave troops in Iraq for up to a century after the war ends. Got it. But how long do we keep U.S. troops in Iraq during the war? As it turns out, that’s indefinite, too.
As Ron Brownstein explains, it’s incumbent on McCain to go into a little more detail.
First, if McCain doesn’t envision a 100-year American front-line combat presence in Iraq, how long is he willing to keep U.S. forces in that role? So far, all he has said is that the United States should withdraw only if it concludes that the Iraq mission is unachievable or when it has achieved success, which he defines as the establishment of “a peaceful, stable, prosperous, democratic state.” […]
McCain has not said when, but he has pledged that Iraqi units will eventually assume the major combat responsibility. That prompts the next question McCain should address: What would then become the mission for the U.S. forces he wants to maintain in Iraq?
McCain hasn’t been able to answer either question. He hasn’t even tried.
He has argued that after the war without end is over, and U.S. troops remain in a stable Iraq for generations, their mission would be to deter external aggression, the same way American troops are in South Korea to prevent North Korea from getting any ideas.
But that doesn’t work in Iraq’s case, either.
[T]he U.S. and South Korea agreed that North Korea posed a threat. The American troop presence in Germany and Japan long rested on a similar agreement about the potential danger from the Soviet Union, notes Ivo Daalder, a Brookings Institution senior fellow in foreign policy.
Although the U.S. considers Iran the most pressing external danger to Iraq, “the overwhelming majority of Iraqis don’t see Iran as a threat,” Daalder says. “They see it as a partner.” If a threat from Iran isn’t the motivation, Al Qaeda might provide the most likely justification for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq. But if Al Qaeda remains a threat there, conditions would likely not meet McCain’s standard that American troops are no longer at risk.
Indeed, skeptics raise another question that fundamentally challenges McCain’s analogy to Germany, Japan, and South Korea: Could U.S. troops ever be accepted in Iraq as completely as they have been in those societies? Or would our forces always be a target in Iraq, not only for Al Qaeda but also for the contending domestic factions? As Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean asked this week, “Does anyone think … if you keep our troops in Iraq for a hundred years, people won’t be … setting off suicide bombs?”
McCain hates the “100 years” talk, because, as he sees it, the discussion removes the context. But therein lies the point: McCain can’t offer any context with depth, because he doesn’t really have a policy.
So, what are we left with? McCain’s policy is to fight an indefinite war, followed by an indefinite military presence. As he sees it, hopefully the Iraqis will reconcile, and hopefully Iraq will become stable, and then hopefully they won’t mind if we stick around for a generation or five while we keep their allies at bay.
Remember, the media still believes McCain is an expert on foreign policy and military matters. Maybe some reporters can read Brownstein’s piece and ask McCain for an explanation?