In recent months, there have been some encouraging trends in Iraq. Violence has been less rampant, and attacks have been less catastrophic. The trend may be temporary, and the possible result of a successful ethnic-cleansing campaign, but for right now, the daily bloodshed is not as devastating as it was up until quite recently.
The White House and its allies, predictably, insist this means the “surge” policy is a success. Obviously, that’s foolish — the administration’s policy was implemented to foster political reconciliation in Iraq, of which there’s been none. Indeed, the political progress has gone backwards, and successes at the local level (the so-called “bottom-up” approach) necessarily undermines the goal of a unified, democratic Iraq that will serve as a beacon for the Middle East.
It’s reached the point in which U.S. officials are beginning to suspect that — surprise, surprise — the goals of the surge may not be attainable after all. Apparently, Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, oddly enough, still don’t like or trust each other.
Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.
In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government’s failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but “it’s unclear how long that window is going to be open.”
The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? “If that doesn’t happen,” Odierno said, “we’re going to have to review our strategy.”
Even the practical defeat of AQI carries a downside. Maj. Mark Brady, who works on reconciliation issues, noted that a Sunni leader told him: “As soon as we finish with al-Qaeda, we start with the Shiite extremists.”
Ugh. Arming both sides of a civil war with no ideas or mechanism in place to achieve reconciliation apparently isn’t a recipe for success. Who could have imagined it.
For what it’s worth, John Podesta, Lawrence Korb, and Brian Katulis are still making the case for the obvious resolution, and lamenting the “strategic drift” that maintains the status quo.
The real security problem in Iraq is a vicious power struggle among competing militias and factions. Foreign terrorists are mainly Sunni and represent only a small percentage of the problem. The Sunni foreign terrorists united with Sunni Iraqis are strongly opposed by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds. And in Anbar province, Sunni tribal leaders rose up against the pro-al-Qaeda Sunni elements well before the surge began. Drifting along the current path actually enhances the al-Qaeda narrative of America as an occupier of Muslim nations.
Similarly, the presence of a large U.S. combat force contributes to regional instability. Since the surge began, the number of internally displaced Iraqis has more than doubled. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has said that more than 2 million Iraqis have left the country, and tens of thousands flee every day, often to squalid camps in Syria and Jordan.
As long as U.S. forces remain in Iraq in significant numbers, regional powers feel free to meddle, knowing that America must bear the consequences. If we clearly state our intent to leave, these states will have incentive to intervene constructively; it would endanger their own security if Iraq were to become a failed state or a launching pad for international terrorism. Even Shiite-dominated Iran, which has become the region’s largest power as a result of the war, would not want an Iraqi haven for Sunni-controlled al-Qaeda.
There is one sure way to stop this drift. The United States must set a firm withdrawal date. It is the only way Iraqis and regional leaders will make the compromises necessary to stabilize Iraq and the entire Middle East. This withdrawal can be completed safely in 12 to 18 months and should be started immediately.
Sounds right to me.